hypersonics - Merchant Marine News

Army and Navy Cancelled March Hypersonic Test Due to Battery Failure

The Army and Navy scrubbed their latest hypersonic test flight due to a battery failure during a pre-launch check, the Navy’s top officer for strategic programs said Friday. Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe told the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee the test from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station will get re-scheduled after the problem […]

A common hypersonic glide body (C-HGB) launches from Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, at approximately 10:30 p.m. local time, March 19, 2020, during a Department of Defense flight experiment. US Navy photo.

The Army and Navy scrubbed their latest hypersonic test flight due to a battery failure during a pre-launch check, the Navy’s top officer for strategic programs said Friday.

Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe told the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee the test from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station will get re-scheduled after the problem that caused the March 5 cancellation “is identified and corrected.”

“The services will leverage an ambitious joint flight test schedule to assess and improve the weapon system design and demonstrate performance against requirements,” Wolfe said in prepared testimony.

Wolfe and his Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, said the two services are on track to deliver “intermediate range strike capability” on land and at sea, and meet important milestones this fiscal year and in the near future.

The Navy will deliver the Common Hypersonic Missile (CPS) to an Army battery at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., this year, Wolfe said.

The battery has completed new equipment training, which included a demonstration that it was C-17 deployable, Rasch said. It’s also road-mobile. The Army designates the missile as its Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).

Hypersonic weapons, moving at least five times the speed of sound, can be delivered from high altitudes in a number of ways – from aircraft, from sea and from a ballistic missile. While not a “be-all and end-all, they are a highly valuable tool,” Michael White, principal director of the hypersonic office in the office of defense research and engineering, said at the hearing.

While the United States was a pioneer in the field, “China is now leading Russia” in this field and has built “a robust infrastructure for research and development,” said Paul Freisthler, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s chief scientist for science and technology. Beijing surprised the world in 2021 with a “round-the-world” test of its hypersonic capability development. China has “three hypersonic wind tunnels capable of operating at speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, Mach 12,” he said.

He added that Russian President Vladimir Putin has boasted that Moscow developed a hypersonic weapon capable of speeds 20 times the speed of sound.

Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) said at the start of the hearing that while the United States paused developing hypersonics at the end of the the 1980s, “Russia and China made the opposite decision. Instead of mimicking our restraint as we hoped, they developed and deployed increasingly sophisticated and numerous hypersonic capabilities of various types – including nuclear-capable and orbital hypersonic weapons.”

The Navy is planning a hypersonic test shot from USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) in 2025 and from a Virginia-class Block V submarine starting in the early 2030s, Wolfe said. He said the naval platforms add stealth and increased survivability.

When asked if the continued investments in hypersonic weapons should continue, Wolfe said, “it’s the Navy view [that] this fills a need.”

Michael Horowitz, director of the Pentagon’s emerging capabilities policy office, added that hypersonics “expand the options” for conventional weapons that leaders have to deter conflict or “keep it from escalating.” He emphasized that the United States is not looking to arm hypersonic platforms with nuclear weapons.

Wolfe and Rausch cited the savings the partnered program has made in developing a common hypersonic glide body, booster stack and joint testing and experimentation.

“No single entity [in private industry] can build a hypersonic capability alone,” Rasch said.

Wolfe and Rasch noted that much of the early work in hypersonics took place in government laboratories.

Earlier this month, President Joe Biden issued a presidential directive that authorized the Defense Production Act to ramp up the hypersonics industrial base. A major goal of invoking the act is for the Pentagon to accelerate hypersonics programs that have shown promise in science and technology or research and development investments into production contracts.

Rausch and Wolfe said their services’ early partnering allowed industry to build up the necessary work force and the government to achieve economy of scale in the buy.

The Pentagon’s goal for the future with hypersonics is “to leverage common production practices,” identify the next generation technologies and “improve the throughput in test and experimentation” to more quickly field the systems and platforms, White said.

While subcommittee ranking member Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) and others pressed the panel’s witnesses for definitions of the Pentagon’s operating concept for hypersonic offensive weapons and active and passive defenses, most deferred the explanations to the follow-up classified session.

In prepared testimony, Horowitz said they are part of a mix of platforms and systems to deter an aggressor now or defeat one in conflict.

“The department is also making substantial investments in a broader array of capabilities, including long-range strike, undersea, and autonomous systems, in addition to hypersonics, that will ensure we can effectively deter through denial. For some mission sets, hypersonics can play a critical role in U.S. capabilities,” Horowitz said in his written testimony.

Navy Planning for December 2025 Hypersonic Missile Test off USS Zumwalt

ARLINGTON, Va., – The Navy plans to perform a hypersonic missile test shot off guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) in December 2025, a service official said today. “There are no less than five captains involved in making sure this happens,” Capt. Tyson Young of the program executive office for the Zumwalt Integrated Combat System said […]

Guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) arrives at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan on Aug. 26, 2022. US Navy Photo

ARLINGTON, Va., – The Navy plans to perform a hypersonic missile test shot off guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) in December 2025, a service official said today.

“There are no less than five captains involved in making sure this happens,” Capt. Tyson Young of the program executive office for the Zumwalt Integrated Combat System said at the American Society for Naval Engineers’ annual Combat Systems Symposium.

While Young is managing the processes on the program manager side of the house, he’s also working on the developmental and technical changes needed to field the hypersonics on Zumwalt.

“We’re integrating an underwater weapons control system with [tactical support center] control in order to affect the data and message transfer to launch the missile,” Young said.

“We’re virtualizing both sets of control systems. My [integrated combat system] and our TSC … are going to do lab testing next month and then we’re going to do an onboard ship demo both in port and underway,” he added.

The requirements for the integrated combat system used to launch the hypersonic off the Zumwalt class will inform how the Navy fields and integrates hypersonic weapons on the Virginia-class attack submarines, according to Young.

“We’re attacking that through what we’re calling minimal integration … to reduce the amount of risk associated with that software,” Young said.

Last month, the Navy issued HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding a $10.5 million contract to plan for the modernization period for Zumwalt and USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001). The Navy has said it wants to field hypersonics on the Zumwalt class in 2025 and the Virginia class in 2028.

The service can field about 12 missiles aboard each Zumwalt-class destroyer, USNI News previously reported.

Young pointed to Zumwalt‘s time operating out in U.S. 7th Fleet last year, noting he had the latitude from the fleet and type commanders to experiment with the ship and its combat systems.

“So the TYCOM of the fleet says do what you need to do to make sure that she’s operational and she’s functional because we understand the history of the program,” Young said.

“I give them the realization that I’m not going to make some change in the combat code or any software program that’s going to regress the capability, but bring additive capability or fix efficiency in the code or stability in the baseline,” he said.

While hypersonics are not nuclear weapons, the Navy’s head of strategic systems programs is overseeing them as part of his portfolio.

“It’s strategic, but it’s not nuclear. If you look at the numbers, particularly with what we’re going to with the ranges, it is very much a strategic asset. You can hold very high-value targets at risk … and you can do that with all these various platforms,” Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe told USNI News in November.

Report to Congress on North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

The following is the Jan. 23, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs. From the report Overview North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile tests and military parades suggest that North Korea […]

The following is the Jan. 23, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs.

From the report

Overview

North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.

According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022 annual threat assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea and believes that over time he will gain international acceptance as a nuclear power.”

United States policy as well as United Nations resolutions call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. In a September 9, 2022, speech to North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un rejected denuclearization talks and vowed the country would continue developing its “nuclear power.” The Assembly adopted a new law that reportedly expands the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to include possible first use in situations that threaten the regime’s survival. The Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.”

Nuclear Testing

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3, 2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile.

In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018 prior to the first Trump-Kim summit. In an October 2018 meeting with then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Kim Jong-un “invited inspectors to visit the [test site] to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled,” but this did not occur. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022.

Nuclear Material Production

North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in 2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at Kangson. A March 2022 IAEA report says that there were no indications of operations at its Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing) plant since its last reprocessing campaign from February to July 2021. The IAEA notes ongoing operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor since July 2021. Spent fuel from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory to extract plutonium for weapons. In September 2022, the IAEA reported ongoing uranium mining, milling, and concentration activities at Pyongsan. Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build.

Nuclear Warheads

Outside experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for between 20 to 60 warheads. A 2021 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report says that North Korea “retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.” Another goal of a nuclear weapons program is to lower the size and weight of a nuclear warhead for deployment on missiles. A July 2017 DIA assessment and some outside observers asserted North Korea had achieved the level of miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device on weapons ranging from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Kim Jong-un in January 2021 said that the country was able to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones.”

Missile Development

North Korea conducted an unprecedented 63 ballistic missile test launches in 2022 according to U.S. government officials. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions prohibit North Korea’s development of the means of delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions specifically ban “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the apogee of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range (intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site to the target.

Download the document here.

Japan Issues Military Equipment Wishlist That Includes Hypersonic Weapons, Unmanned Systems

Japan’s Ministry of Defense this week issued a document detailing new military equipment it’s developing, with rationales and status updates for programs ranging from hypersonic weapons to unmanned underwater vehicles. The capabilities include research on hypersonic cruise missiles, the development of high-speed glide bombs for island defense, target observation munitions, Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) control […]

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, announced the successful completion of Japan Flight Test Mission-07 (JFTM-07), held off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii, on Nov. 18, 2022. MDA Photo

The capabilities include research on hypersonic cruise missiles, the development of high-speed glide bombs for island defense, target observation munitions, Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) control technology, development of new sea mines, improved Type 12 anti-ship missiles, the mass production and deployment of high-speed glide bombs, mass production of the improved SH-60K anti-submarine warfare helicopter, a new anti-ship missile for maritime patrol aircraft, the mass production of torpedoes with a silent power unit and the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles. The disclosure is in line with a 2019 MoD enactment on measures for clarification and transparency on new military equipment.

On hypersonic cruise missiles, the MoD said its study found only domestic research and development candidates met the operational concept and performance requirements. It selected a domestic operational research demonstration to develop prototypes for evaluation and funding for the research under the Fiscal Year 2023 defense budget request. (Japan’s fiscal year begins on April 1. The MoD did not disclose the amount allocated in the document, but the MoD’s FY 2023 budget request asked for 58.5 billion yen, or $454 million.

For high-speed glide bombs, the MoD said it will develop them with long ranges and make them capable of traveling at supersonic speeds and high altitudes from various points in Japan to deal with invasions of islands. An MoD study concluded that only domestic candidates can meet the requirements for operational concept and performance, so Japan will pursue domestic development. The FY 2023 budget request sought 200.3 billion yen, or $1.54 billion, for development. A second entry on building and deploying high-speed glide bombs said that while Japan expects to finish research into the bombs by FY 2025, the bombs could operationally deploy as early as possible. This could potentially happen before the research finishes, so acquisition costs were factored into the FY 2023 budget request. It did not give an exact timeframe as to when manufacturing and deployment will begin.

A tomahawk cruise missile launches from the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG-86) for a live-fire exercise during Valiant Shield 2018 on Sept. 18, 2018. US Navy Photo

On the Tomahawk cruise missiles, the MoD said they are necessary to acquire a stand-off missile capability for defense as soon as possible and that the Tomahawk met the criteria, like acquisition schedule and performance. The acquisition costs were included in the FY 2023 budget request, which sough 211.3 billion yen, or $1.62 billion, along with an additional 110 billion yen, or $847 million, for software, equipment, technology transfer fees and training.

It’s unclear if the target observation munitions entry referred solely to loitering munitions or unmanned air vehicles to provide target acquisition data for other weapon systems or a combination of both. Again the MoD chose to go the domestic development path, as it was the only was to meet Japan’s requirements and development expenses that were factored into the FY 2023 budget request. The MoD said it will not disclose overall procurement cost, per unit cost, and production cost because it could suggest the number of munitions procured. But the life cycle cost is expected to be 118.2 billion yen, or $911 million.

For research on UUV control technology, Japan will acquire and build two types of domestic UUVs to test out actual operations at sea, with the test UUVs meant to control smaller UUVs. UUV1 will only be a testing vehicle, while UUV2 may evolve into a mass-produced operational model once the tests are completed. Japan will also domestically develop new compact and lightweight sea mines that can be deployed from various platforms and remotely controlled. It’s unclear when these would get operationally fielded.

Development of the improved Type 12 ground-launched anti-ship missile is expected to finish by FY 2025, though the missile will deploy as soon as possible. The MoD did not detail what the improvements would be, but it has already disclosed plans to extend the range from 200 kilometers to over 1000 kilometers. The MoD included 127.7 billion yen, or $985 million, in the FY 2023 budget for both research and development, along with production and acquisition.

A new anti-ship missile will deploy on Japan’s maritime patrol aircraft to replace the existing ASM-1C and Harpoon anti-ship missiles in service, though the type and manufacture has not been disclosed. Pictures of the missiles during flight tests show that it’s likely an improved air-launched version of the Type 17 anti-ship missile. A submarine-launched torpedo with a quieter power unit will also come online, though the document did not detail whether this is an improved version of the Type 18 torpedo or a new torpedo design. It only said that the new power unit is quieter than the one in existing Type 18 torpedoes. Per unit costs were also not disclosed.

The improved version of the Japanese-produced Mitsubishi Heavy Industries SH-60K, – built under license from Sikorsky – commonly known outside the MoD as SH-60L, had an average unit production cost of 8.1 billion yen, or $62 million, as of August 2022, according to the MoD document. The life cycle cost is projected at 1248 billion yen, or $9.61 billion, when 80 aircraft are procured. Though not stated in the document, the helicopter is expected to enter service by the end of FY 2023, replacing the current SH-60Ks in service with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

SECNAV: New Virginia Attack Boat Contracts Still Stalled Over Missile Insurance Issue; Lockheed, Northrop Clear Hypersonic Deal with Navy

ARLINGTON, Va. – The Navy and General Dynamics are still at an impasse over an insurance spat that has resulted in the 11-month delay to contracts for two Virginia-class attack submarines, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro told USNI News on Wednesday. The service and the submarine builder disagree on the share of responsibility […]

Rendering of Block V Virginia-class submarine with Virginia Payload Module. General Dynamics Electric Boat Image

The service and the submarine builder disagree on the share of responsibility in the event of an accident occurring either during construction or operations aboard attack boats that field Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. Until 2018, the Navy had financially protected General Dynamics Electric Boat from liability in the event of a Tomahawk accident in new submarine construction under an unusually high-risk provision due to its higher energy propellant.

The Navy says that EB should cover the risk, while General Dynamics has said they are unable to secure an insurance policy that would cover any accidents with high-energy propellant in the missiles that could cost billions in damages and be an existential risk for the company, several sources familiar with the negotiations have told USNI News.

“The American taxpayers have the right that when a company does something that is willful and wrong … and it results in a catastrophic event, that they not be the ones to be held accountable, that industry be held accountable for that. That’s my responsibility to the American taxpayer, as a U.S. government official,” Del Toro told reporters during a press roundtable at the Surface Navy Association symposium.
“I’m going to hold the ground and I’m willing to compromise on some things. I’m not willing to compromise on everything. They’re going to have to come to the table with reasonable language that the American taxpayer can accommodate on that ground.”

A spokesman for General Dynamics declined to comment on the contract dispute when contacted by USNI News.

Del Toro would not elaborate on the specific divisions between EB and his office when asked by USNI News.

“I’m not going to go into the details of what the negotiation is exactly over. What I’m saying is, you need to come back with reasonable language that is acceptable to the American taxpayer and that myself and the Secretary of Defense and everybody else is comfortable with before we sign the agreement,” he said.
“We continue to have those discussions and I just spoke to one of their senior VPs and basically encourage them to come to the table with language and compromises that make sense for the U.S. government.”

The split between the service and the shipbuilder has stalled the advance procurement contracts for two Block V Virginia-attack boat that were set to start in Fiscal Year 2024 and are now almost a year late, several sources confirmed to USNI News over the last month.

The lag in the contracts for the submarines and indemnification issues from Tomahawks and the emerging hypersonic missiles came up in the Fiscal Year 2023 defense policy bill.

“We remain concerned with the lack of resolution regarding open indemnification requests related to the Conventional Prompt Strike program, other weapons programs, and the associated planned employment platforms. We note these delays could lead to significant delivery delays for both Navy and Army hypersonic weapons programs, the next block of Virginia-class submarines, and other programs,” reads the explanatory statement accompanying the compromise Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act.

In terms of hypersonic missiles, which will be fielded on attack boats with the Virginia Payload Module and the Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyers, the Navy signed an indemnification agreement on Tuesday with Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, Del Toro told USNI News.

“Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman came to the table in a reasonable way and we came to an agreement on what the language should be,” he said.
“So, there’s no reason why General Dynamics can’t do the same.”

Navy Awards HII Planning Contract for Zumwalt Hypersonic Upgrades

HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding won a $10.5 million contract to plan for the modernization period of the first two Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyers that will include the installation of hypersonic missiles on the two warships. Ingalls will work until December to complete the planning portion of the modernization period for USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) and USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001), according to […]

Guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) steams behind amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7) on April 9, 2022. US Navy Photo

Ingalls will work until December to complete the planning portion of the modernization period for USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) and USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001), according to a Friday announcement from the Pentagon.

Though not stated in the contract summary, the period will include the removal of the existing twin 155mm Advanced Gun System on each ship to install four 87-inch tubes for hypersonic missiles, USNI News has previously reported. The service has determined that installing the Common Hypersonic Glide Bodies (C-HGB) aboard the 16,000-ton destroyers is the fastest way to get a prompt global strike weapon to sea.

“We’re talking about deploying this system on DDG-1000 in 2025, that’s three years from now,” Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe, the head of the Navy’s strategic systems programs, told reporters at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium in November. “We got to get on with getting all of the design for the Zumwalt, getting all of those tubes in there, as we pulled out the forward gun mounts. We’ve gotten to put these large diameter tubes in there, and then finish the integration work into the combat system.”

Three Common Hypersonic Glide Bodies (C-HGB) and their boosters could fit in each 87-inch tube – or 12 missiles per Zumwalt, USNI News understands.

The Navy plans to field hypersonic weapons on the first Virginia-class submarine, with the Virginia Payload Module due to deploy by 2029.

Zumwalt is set to arrive at Ingalls for the upgrade by the end of the year. It’s unclear if Zumwalt-class ship Lyndon B. Johnson (DDG-1002), currently at the Mississippi yard, will also get the tubes installed.

Over the last several years, Ingalls has invested $1 billion in expanding and modernizing its yard, the company noted in a statement.

The following is the complete Jan. 6, 2023, contract announcement.

Huntington Ingalls Inc., Pascagoula, Mississippi, is awarded a $10,516,400 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00024-23-C-2324) for the DDG 1000 and DDG 1001 modernization period planning. Work will be performed in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and is expected to be completed by December 2023. Fiscal 2023 other procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $9,744,650 (100%) will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procures in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1) — only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-23-C-2324).won a $10 million

Virginia Attack Boat Program Stalled Over Tomahawk, Hypersonic Missile Insurance Rift

THE PENTAGON — Advanced procurement contracts for two of the Navy’s Block V Virginia-class attack submarines have been stalled for 10 months due to an impasse between the service and its lead submarine builder over insurance related to Tomahawk missiles and future hypersonic weapons, USNI News has learned. General Dynamics and the Navy are split […]

Rendering of Block V Virginia-class submarine with Virginia Payload Module. General Dynamics Electric Boat Image

General Dynamics and the Navy are split over which organization should be financially responsible if an accident occurred, either during construction or operations, aboard attack boats that field Tomahawks. The disagreement has held up the final long lead items contracts for the two submarines the Navy plans to buy in Fiscal Year 2024, four sources familiar with the conflict have told USNI News. Long lead contracts are typically issued two years ahead of the final construction contracts.

Since 2018, the Navy has not extended the liability protections for Tomahawks to General Dynamics’ new submarine construction, arguing the company should provide its own insurance to cover any accidents that result from its vertical launch system, according to a July report to Congress from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment obtained by USNI News. The company in turn has told the Navy it’s unable to obtain adequate insurance to meet the risk of an explosive accident that could result in billions of dollars in damages, the sources told USNI News.

USS Vermont (SSN-792) makes her way up the Thames River and past New London as she returns home after routine operations to Submarine Base New London on Wednesday, Feb. 3, 2021. US Navy Photo

The dispute over the obscure insurance issue between the defense company and the Navy could further delay new submarine construction. The Navy also denied a similar request from Lockheed Martin to indemnify the company from liability should an accident occur with the under-development Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile, a move that could further delay a new weapons program the Navy plans to field on the Virginia-class attack boat’s Virginia Payload Module. Hypersonic weapons and new attack submarines are high among the Department of Defense’s acquisition priorities, officials have said during the rollout of the latest Pentagon budget.

Under the current law, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro makes the final decision on indemnification for Navy and Marine Corps contracts.

The current Fiscal Year 2023 defense policy bill — passed by the House last week and awaiting a vote in the Senate — includes language requiring the Department of Defense to study the indemnification issue and the Navy to deliver a report to Congress on the indemnification issue for the Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system.

Sailors assigned to the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS-39) weapons handling division conduct an offload of a Tomahawk missile from the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN-758) on Feb 1, 2022. US Navy Photo

The provision is a compromise from the House version, which would have stripped the indemnification authority from the service secretaries and put it under the purview of the Secretary of Defense.

“We are aware of the language in the draft NDAA and continue to actively work with industry to address any concerns related to conventional prompt strike, other weapons, and their employment platforms,” Capt. J.D. Dorsey, the spokesman for Del Toro, told USNI News this week.

‘Unusually High Risk’

Sailors assigned to the Emory S. Land-class submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS-40) lower an inert Tomahawk missile training shape from the Frank Cable into the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Springfield (SSN-761), April 24, 2022. US Navy Photo

For decades, the Navy financially indemnified General Dynamics Electric Boat against a Tomahawk accident on its submarines under an “unusually high risk” provision born from the service’s nuclear ballistic missile program.

The Tomahawk and the Navy’s ballistic missiles, like the retired Poseidon and current Trident II D5s, employ a high-energy solid rocket propellant that has been used for years without incident but carries a small risk of devastating explosions.

“The actual or potential cost of this indemnification is impossible to estimate since it is contingent upon the occurrence and of a nuclear incident or unusually hazardous incident attributable to the utilization of high-energy propellants,” reads a 2008 indemnification memo from then Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter.
“Such incidents may never occur; but in the event of a major event, losses could be catastrophic … In the event of a major incident arising from nuclear risks or unusually hazardous risks attributable to the utilization of high-energy propellants, the possible claims against and loss to the contractors and subcontractors could exceed amounts that contractors should be expected to cover and could easily exceed available insurance.”

The future USS Oregon (SSN-788) pierside at General Dynamics Electric Boat on Feb. 28, 2022. USNI News Photo

For example, if the propellant exploded at a naval base or at a repair yard, the results would not only damage the submarine but also other nearby ships and infrastructure, with damages that could easily roll into the billions, not including additional claims related to anyone killed or injured in the blast.

The Navy fielded a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk for decades and the service grouped the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile with the other nuclear submarine-launched missile in terms of indemnification, according to a July Pentagon report to Congress.

“In the past, DON approved indemnification requests for nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles (TLAM-N) and related systems. In 2015, the Navy completed all actions related to the retirement of the TLAM-N, but the Tomahawk continued to be included in the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) annual indemnifications through 2018,” reads the report.

Image of Nuclear TLAM. via U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

“The period of coverage for the non-nuclear version of the Tomahawk was brief, and DON adjusted its indemnification decision in a reasonable period of time … DoN never considered Tomahawk propellants to present an unusually hazardous risk on their own, nor does DoN believe contractors lack the ability to obtain adequate insurance for the risks this missile system now presents.”

The Navy does not indemnify Tomahawks aboard surface ships as an unusually hazardous risk, but the risk of an accident on a surface ship is much lower than it is aboard an underway submarine, one source familiar with the system told USNI News.

General Dynamics is the prime contractor for the Tomahawk vertical launching systems aboard the Navy’s Los Angeles and Virginia-class attack submarines, but Raytheon builds the actual missile.

“General Dynamics Electric Boat’s request for indemnification is different, as the company is under contract solely for the launch systems, not the missiles,” reads the July Pentagon report.

The fear from a company like GD is that claims from a catastrophic incident could be an existential threat to the company, three sources familiar with the company’s reasoning told USNI News.

Virginia-class submarine Delaware (SSN-791) was moved out of a construction facility into a floating dry dock using a transfer car system in 2018. HII Photo

A General Dynamics spokesman acknowledged a request for comment but referred USNI News to the Navy. A Raytheon spokesperson declined to comment on the issue when contacted by USNI News. A Lockheed Martin spokesman referred questions from USNI News on their indemnification request to the Navy.

Defense contractors involved in the effort have been unsuccessful in finding an insurer to cover the risk of a Tomahawk accident, one lawmaker said during a May House Armed Services Committee hearing.

“One issue, which I think the Navy has created some schedule risk was the change in policy for unusual hazardous risk indemnification, which again, there’s just no question the Navy changed its policy in the last administration, in terms of how, you know, who bears the cost in terms of indemnification,” Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.), who chairs the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee chair, said during an exchange with Jay Stefany, who at the time was performing the duties of the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.
“[Private industries] have found insurance coverage that is the maximum allowed in the market, $2 billion of coverage, which I think is certainly a good faith effort.”

In a July military readiness hearing, Courtney said repair work on both Virginia-class and Los Angeles-class attack boats at the private shipyards could stall due to the indemnification rules.

“This issue really is just screaming out for a resolution. And I honestly believe there’s a compromise here,” he You know, we can have contractors get insurance — risk insurance to the maximum that’s available in the market. But that — as was the case for 40 years, that the Navy will be there sort of as a backstop… this high-risk activity.”

Report to Congress on U.S.-North Korea Relations

The following is the Dec. 12, 2022, Congression Research Service report, U.S.-North Korea Relations. From the report North Korea’s advances in nuclear weapons and missile capabilities since 2016 under its leader Kim Jong-un have catapulted Pyongyang from a threat to U.S. interests in East Asia to a potential direct threat to the U.S. homeland. U.S. […]

The following is the Dec. 12, 2022, Congression Research Service report, U.S.-North Korea Relations.

From the report

North Korea’s advances in nuclear weapons and missile capabilities since 2016 under its leader Kim Jong-un have catapulted Pyongyang from a threat to U.S. interests in East Asia to a potential direct threat to the U.S. homeland. U.S. policy on North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has focused primarily on the DPRK’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Other U.S. concerns include illicit DPRK activities, such as cyberattacks and cyber-crime, as well as the potential resumption of small-scale conventional attacks against U.S. ally South Korea (officially known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK). Congress has expressed particular concern about the state of human rights in North Korea, passing laws directing the State Department to prioritize pressuring the Pyongyang regime to improve human rights conditions.

Since U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the latter’s nuclear weapons program broke down in 2019, North Korea largely has ignored attempts by the United States and ROK to resume dialogue. In 2022, Kim declared North Korea will never denuclearize. North Korea also has continued to test missiles of various ranges and capabilities, including more than 60 ballistic missiles since the start of 2022, in violation of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) requirements. The tests appear to have advanced the reliability and precision of the DPRK’s missile forces, and improved its ability to defeat regional missile defense systems. In 2022, North Korea tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the first time since 2017. Since early 2022, many observers have seen evidence that North Korea is preparing to conduct its seventh nuclear weapons test, which would be its first since 2017. North Korea has undertaken its missile tests despite hardships resulting from near-total closure of its borders since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

As the DPRK demonstrates greater military capability, some Members of the 117th Congress have pushed the Biden Administration to offer greater incentives for North Korea to return to negotiations. Others have sought to require the Administration to tighten pressure by enacting additional sanctions legislation. In December 2022, a bicameral agreement on the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 7776, as amended) would require the President to develop a strategy to combat the DPRK’s “repressive information environment” and authorize $10 million annually for five years to increase U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting and information dissemination into North Korea. Some Members support reauthorizing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which seeks to elevate U.S. policy on the DPRK’s human rights record, including the appointment of a special envoy for North Korean human rights issues. Authorities in the 2004 act expired at the end of FY2022, and the special envoy position has been vacant since January 2017. Amid signs that basic human needs inside North Korea are not being met, some Members of Congress have proposed offering food and medical aid packages to Pyongyang and/or easing the process for obtaining sanctions waivers and licenses for those delivering humanitarian aid.

Download the document here.

Navy Exploring ‘Surface Strike’ Upgrades for Zumwalt Destroyers

The Navy wants to upgrade its Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyers with a new radar, electronic weapons suite and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, as the service seeks to integrate the platform into the blue water fleet, according to a government request for information issued earlier this month. The Zumwalt Enterprise Upgrade Solution, also known as ZEUS, would […]

Guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) arrives at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan on Aug. 26, 2022. US Navy Photo

The Zumwalt Enterprise Upgrade Solution, also known as ZEUS, would upgrade the destroyer’s radar from Raytheon’s AN/SPY-3 Dual Band Radar to its AN/SPY-6, which the Navy is fielding on the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers.

Before executing ZEUS, the Navy also wants to update its Total Ship Computing Environment infrastructure (TSCEi). But that initiative would not fall under the ZEUS overhaul, according to the RFI issued earlier this month.

The “primary mission of the DDG 1000 class remains Surface Strike,” the RFI reads.

The service is evaluating both the inclusion of MK 41 Vertical Launch System software and the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program, or SEWIP, as part of the ZEUS effort.

As the Navy assesses the potential radar and software upgrades for Zumwalt, it’s also preparing to install hypersonic missiles on the lead ship in the class next year.

USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000), which recently wrapped up an underway in the Western Pacific, will go into the dry dock in late 2023 for an 18-month maintenance availability to receive the hypersonic upgrades in Fiscal Year 2024 and FY 2025, Capt. Shea Thompson, the commodore for Surface Development Squadron 1, told reporters earlier this month.

During the recent underway in the Pacific, the Navy had the chance to test Zumwalt’s capabilities and reliability as it learned how to maintain the platform, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Sam Paparo said earlier this month.

“We intend to upgrade its mission systems. We intend to employ its stealthy capabilities, its passive detection, its [mission bay], the ability to integrate undersea unmanned capabilities, surface unmanned capabilities and to really use it as an all-domain platform that can collect. It can sense,” Paparo said.
“It can execute rapid disorienting fires and can do so in contested environments to be a difference maker and an enabling capability. This year was a first step. It was exciting. We tested her. We wrung out its crew. We built confidence in our ability to sustain her. We put her to sea for long periods of time. We gained confidence in her propulsion systems and her weapon systems.”

Report to Congress on Emerging Military Technologies

The following is the Nov. 1, 2022 Congressional Research Service report, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress. From the report Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological […]

The following is the Nov. 1, 2022 Congressional Research Service report, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress.

From the report

Members of Congress and Pentagon officials are increasingly focused on developing emerging military technologies to enhance U.S. national security and keep pace with U.S. competitors. The U.S. military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite U.S. national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel observed, this development has threatened to erode the United States’ traditional sources of military advantage. The Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a number of initiatives to arrest this trend. For example, in 2014, DOD announced the Third Offset Strategy, an effort to exploit emerging technologies for military and security purposes as well as associated strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation. In support of this strategy, DOD established a number of organizations focused on defense innovation, including the Defense Innovation Unit and the Defense Wargaming Alignment Group.

More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy echoed the underpinnings of the Third Offset Strategy, noting that U.S. national security will likely be

affected by rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war…. New technologies include advanced computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology—the very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.

Similarly, the 2022 National Defense Strategy notes that artificial intelligence, quantum science, autonomy, biotechnology, and space technologies have the potential to change warfighting. The United States is the leader in developing many of these technologies. However, China and Russia—key strategic competitors—are making steady progress in developing advanced military technologies. As these technologies are integrated into foreign and domestic military forces and deployed, they could hold significant implications for the future of international security writ large, and will have to be a significant focus for Congress, both in terms of funding and program oversight.

This report provides an overview of selected emerging military technologies in the United States, China, and Russia:

artificial intelligence,
lethal autonomous weapons,
hypersonic weapons,
directed energy weapons,
biotechnology, and
quantum technology.

It also discusses relevant initiatives within international institutions to monitor or regulate these technologies, considers the potential implications of emerging military technologies for warfighting, and outlines associated issues for Congress. These issues include the level and stability of funding for emerging technologies, the management structure for emerging technologies, the challenges associated with recruiting and retaining technology workers, the acquisitions process for rapidly evolving and dual-use technologies, the protection of emerging technologies from theft and expropriation, and the governance and regulation of emerging technologies. Such issues could hold implications for congressional authorization, appropriation, oversight, and treaty-making.

Download the document here.