Category: Congressional research service

Report on National Security Implications of 5G Networks

The following is the March 14, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies.  From the report The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial […]

The following is the March 14, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies. 

From the report

The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control (C2); and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.

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Report to Congress on Libya and U.S. Policy

The following is the March 7, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Libya and U.S. Policy. From the report Twelve years after a 2011 uprising that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments […]

The following is the March 7, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Libya and U.S. Policy.

From the report

Twelve years after a 2011 uprising that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The postponement of planned elections in 2021, Libyans’ continuing lack of consensus over constitutional and legal arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations (U.N.)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya’s instability and pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers.

Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent Libya from serving as a permissive environment for transnational terrorist groups and have taken different approaches to conflict and competition among Libyans. The Biden Administration supports the holding of new elections in Libya and has used U.S. influence to bolster U.N.-led mediation efforts to that end. Congress has appropriated funds to enable U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, and some Members have called for more assertive U.S. engagement.

War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election

Conflict reerupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA, alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to seize the capital, Tripoli, from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has remained divided since, with foreign forces still present, and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west of Sirte (Figure 1). During 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and the U.N. has deployed civilian monitors at Libyans’ request.

In 2021, members of a U.N.-appointed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim executive authority and Government of National Unity (GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until elections or through June 2022. In 2021, the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State (HCS, an advisory representative body) in an attempt to establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021. However, disputes over candidacy criteria and constitutional and legal issues persisted, leading to an indefinite postponement of the elections. U.N. and U.S. officials have sought to preserve momentum toward elections, amid contending Libyan proposals and initiatives. Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence and Timeline

  • 2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
  • 2012 Parliamentary elections. Transitional cabinet seated.
  • 2014 Elections for constitutional drafting body and parliament. Disputed results fuel conflict. U.S. diplomats depart.
  • 2015 International mediation yields agreement to form Government of National Accord (GNA).
  • 2016 House of Representatives (HOR) withholds GNA endorsement. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with U.S. military support.
  • 2018 Libyan National Army (LNA) controls eastern Libya.
  • 2019 LNA offensive against Tripoli; Turkey intervenes.
  • 2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.
  • 2021 LPDF selects Interim Executive Authority members. HOR approves interim Government of National Unity (GNU). U.N.
  • Security Council endorses ceasefire monitoring and election date, but election postponed.
  • 2022 HOR selects replacement interim government. GNU leaders object and, after militia clashes, retain control of the capital.
  • 2023 U.N. plans High Level Steering Panel to organize elections.

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Report to Congress on Large Unmanned Aerial System Transfer to Ukraine

The following is the March 1, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, Large Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Transfer to Ukraine: Issues for Congress. From the report In mid-2022, Ukraine reportedly requested that the Biden Administration transfer to Ukraine large advanced Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Ukraine argues that access to these weapon systems would improve its air […]

The following is the March 1, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, Large Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Transfer to Ukraine: Issues for Congress.

From the report

In mid-2022, Ukraine reportedly requested that the Biden Administration transfer to Ukraine large advanced Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Ukraine argues that access to these weapon systems would improve its air operations against Russian ground forces. In addition, the U.S. Air Force reportedly proposed the transfer of MQ-9 Reaper UAS to Ukraine in spring 2022. Some Members of Congress have expressed support for sending large UAS to Ukraine. For example, on September 21, 2022, a bipartisan group of 17 Members of the House of Representatives wrote to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin expressing support for the transfer of UAS like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle or the MQ-9A Reaper. Similarly, on November 22, 2022, a bipartisan group of 16 Senators also wrote to Secretary Austin expressing support for transfer of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Congress authorized the transfer of armed UAS to Ukraine (through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative) in the FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-263, §1241(b). The Administration has reportedly expressed concern that Russia could capture and exploit some sensitive electronic components on these aircraft, such as electrooptical/infrared cameras. This Insight addresses potential issues Congress may consider if the Administration proposes a potential transfer of large UAS to Ukraine as the situation in the zone of conflict changes.

Large UAS like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle and MQ-9A Reaper—sometimes referred to as medium altitude long endurance UAS—provide continuous surveillance and reconnaissance and can be armed with weapons like the AGM-114 Hellfire II missile, GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb, and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). Large UAS require a 5,000-foot runway to take off and land, along with a ground control station (GCS) accommodating multiple two-person crews to operate the aircraft. The radio frequency signal connecting the aircraft to the GCS can be line-of-sight or relayed through another airborne platform or satellite. (For more information, see CRS Report R47188, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Roles, Missions, and Future Concepts.)

The United States has supplied small and medium UAS to Ukraine. The Biden Administration first announced the transfer of these UAS to Ukraine in March 2022, which included the Phoenix Ghost and Switchblade, categorized as tactical UAS, and the RQ-20B Puma AE, a reconnaissance UAS. In August 2022, the Administration announced the planned transfer of the medium ScanEagle surveillance UAS to improve the Ukrainian military’s capability to find and target Russian artillery and troop positions.

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Report to Congress on Navy Ship Names

The following is the March 1, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress.  From the report Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types […]

The following is the March 1, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress. 

From the report

Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy’s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships.

Section 370 of the FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021) established a commission, commonly referred to as the Naming Commission, regarding the removal and renaming of certain Department of Defense assets (including ships) that commemorate the Confederate States of America (CFA) or any person who served voluntarily with the CFA. The Naming Commission released its recommendations in August and September 2022. Consistent with one of the commission’s recommendations, the Navy on February 27, 2023, announced that the cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) would be renamed the USS Robert Smalls.

Names for Navy ship types currently or recently procured for the Navy include the following:

  • The first and second SSBN-826 class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been named District of Columbia and Wisconsin.
  • Until recently, Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines have generally been named for states, but the four most recently named Virginia-class boats have instead been named in honor of earlier U.S. Navy attack submarines.
  • Of the Navy’s 15 most recently named aircraft carriers, 10 have been named for past U.S. Presidents and 2 for Members of Congress.
  • Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy.
  • The first three FFG-62 class frigates have been named Constellation, Congress, and Chesapeake, in honor of three of the first six U.S. Navy ships authorized by Congress in 1794.
  • Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) were named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities.
  • Amphibious assault ships are being named for U.S. Marine Corps battles, early U.S. Navy sailing ships, or aircraft carriers from World War II.
  • San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001.
  • John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights.
  • Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities.
  • Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines.
  • Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes.

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Report to Congress on Syria and U.S. Policy

The following is the Congressional Research Service Feb. 24, 2023, In Focus report: Syria and U.S. Policy. From the report Since 2011, conflict between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and opposition forces seeking his removal has displaced roughly half of the country’s population and killed over half a million people. Five countries […]

The following is the Congressional Research Service Feb. 24, 2023, In Focus report: Syria and U.S. Policy.

From the report

Since 2011, conflict between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and opposition forces seeking his removal has displaced roughly half of the country’s population and killed over half a million people. Five countries operate in or maintain military forces in Syria: Russia, Turkey (Türkiye), Iran, Israel, and the United States. The United States seeks a negotiated political settlement to the Syria conflict and the enduring defeat of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL). Issues facing U.S. policymakers include responding to threats posed by IS remnants and detainees, countering Al Qaeda, facilitating humanitarian access, and managing Russian and Iranian challenges to U.S. operations. The February 2023 earthquakes created additional humanitarian needs in northwest Syria; U.S. response efforts seek to assist earthquake victims without bolstering the Asad regime.

Areas of Control

Rival administrations hold territory in Syria, including:

The Asad Government

The Asad government—backed by Russia, Iran, and aligned militia forces—controls about two thirds of Syria’s territory, including most major cities. In 2021, President Asad won a fourth seven-year term; U.S. officials described the election as “an insult to democracy.” Pockets of armed resistance to Asad rule remain, particularly in the south.

Kurdish-Arab Military and Civilian Authorities

Following the defeat of the Islamic State by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish authorities and their Arab partners in northeast Syria established the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), also known as the Self Administration of Northeast Syria (SANES). The SDF and its political wing (the Syrian Democratic Council, SDC) play a leading role in the AANES, whose leaders have stated that it is not aligned with either the Asad government or with opposition forces. Turkey has clashed with the main Kurdish group within the SDF because of its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

Opposition and Extremist Forces

Opposition-held areas of northwest Syria are administered by the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). The SSG was established in 2017 and is affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham, which is an FTO due to its links to Al Qaeda. Many residents of this area have been displaced from areas of Syria now under Asad control, and an estimated 75% depend on U.N. assistance to meet their basic needs.

Turkish Forces and Aligned Militias

Turkish-held areas of northern Syria include territories occupied by Turkish forces in cooperation with Syrian Arab proxy forces. In these areas, Turkey has established local councils subordinate to the Turkish provinces they border, with Turkish provincial governments overseeing the provision of some basic services.

2023 Earthquakes

On February 6, 2023, successive 7.8 and 7.5 magnitude earthquakes struck southern Turkey near the Syrian border, resulting in over 47,000 fatalities across both countries. Within Syria, the northwest—including areas controlled by opposition and extremist groups, and by Turkish-backed Syrian militia forces—was most impacted.

Following international pressure, President Asad on February 13 authorized the United Nations to use the Bab al Salam and Al Ra’ee border crossings to reach opposition held areas of northwest Syria for a period of three months. Prior to this, U.N. agencies were limited to the Bab al Hawa crossing, which remains the only border crossing authorized by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) for the delivery of cross border aid into Syria.

U.S. Response. On February 9, U.S. officials announced $85 million in humanitarian assistance to earthquake-affected populations in Turkey and Syria. On February 19, U.S. officials announced an additional $100 million in Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) funds and humanitarian assistance to support the earthquake response. While stating that “U.S. sanctions programs already contain robust exemptions for humanitarian efforts,” on February 9, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued Syria General License 23, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Earthquake Relief Efforts in Syria,” which authorizes for 180 days all transactions related to earthquake relief that would otherwise be prohibited by the Syria Sanctions Regulations.

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Report to Congress on The Purple Heart

The following is the Feb. 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, The Purple Heart: Background and Issues for Congress. From the report The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly […]

The following is the Feb. 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service Report, The Purple Heart: Background and Issues for Congress.

From the report

The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers.

Events over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart’s eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes.

While medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power “To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart.

Previous debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers “should” be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider, if it chooses to act on this issue.

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Report to Congress on Hypersonic Weapons

The following is the Feb. 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service report, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress. From the report The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. […]

The following is the Feb. 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service report, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.

From the report

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The Pentagon’s FY2023 budget request for hypersonic research is $4.7 billion—up from $3.8 billion in the FY2022 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $225.5 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.

As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following:

  • What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?
  • Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
  • How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
  • Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

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Report to Congress on Military, Intelligence Issues on Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The following is the Feb. 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service report Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects. From the report Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s borders since 2021, Russia invaded […]

The following is the Feb. 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service report Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects.

From the report

Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. After a steady buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s borders since 2021, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, with Russian ground forces attacking from multiple directions.

Initially, Russian forces made gains along all lines of advance. However, Russian forces ran into effective and likely unexpected levels of Ukrainian resistance from the invasion’s outset. In addition, many analysts and officials assess that, during this first stage of the war, the Russian military performed poorly overall and was hindered by specific tactical choices, poor logistics, ineffective communications, and command-and-control issues. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), while at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage in personnel, equipment, and resources, have proven more resilient and adaptive than Russia expected.

Over the course of the first several weeks of the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military had to adjust to various setbacks and other developments on the ground. With many of its advances stalled, Russian defense officials announced in late March 2022 that Russian military operations would focus on eastern Ukraine, including the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas, where Russian-led separatists have been fighting since 2014) and that Russia would withdraw its forces around Kyiv and Chernihiv in the north. Russia subsequently gained additional territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and held territory in other regions, including Kharkiv in the northeast and Zaporizhia and Kherson in the south.

In September 2022, Ukrainian forces succeeded in retaking territory in Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Kherson regions. In this effort, the UAF demonstrated an ability to deploy forces effectively to conduct offensive operations, and the Russian military continued to suffer from systemic and structural failings. Fighting subsequently has focused on the Donbas, specifically the town of Bakhmut and surrounding territory. Amid intense attritional fighting, both sides have been reforming and reconstituting units for spring offensives after suffering heavy personnel and equipment losses.

Approaching one year since Russia’s 2022 invasion, debates continue over each side’s ability to establish and equip units capable of conducting offensive operations, with many observers skeptical either Russia or Ukraine will be able to achieve a decisive battlefield victory in the near future. At the same time, both sides anticipate intensive localized offensives.

Prior Congresses have considered numerous measures in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The 118th Congress is likely to continue tracking these developments closely as it considers upcoming policy decisions on U.S. and international efforts to support Ukraine militarily, conducts oversight of security assistance, monitors allegations of war crimes, and examines U.S. and international policies to deter further Russian aggression.

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Report on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas

The following is the Feb. 8 2023, Congressional Research Service report, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress. From the report In a context of great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s actions in the SCS—including extensive […]

The following is the Feb. 8 2023, Congressional Research Service report, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress.

From the report

In a context of great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China’s actions in the SCS—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.

Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China.

The issue for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.

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Report to Congress on Hypersonic Missile Defense

The following is the Jan. 24, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress. From the report The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Space Development Agency (SDA) are currently developing elements of a hypersonic missile defense system to defend against hypersonic weapons and other emerging missile threats. These elements include […]

The following is the Jan. 24, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress.

From the report

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Space Development Agency (SDA) are currently developing elements of a hypersonic missile defense system to defend against hypersonic weapons and other emerging missile threats. These elements include the tracking and transport layers of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) and various interceptor programs. As MDA and SDA continue to develop these systems, Congress may consider implications for oversight and defense authorizations and appropriations.

Background

Hypersonic weapons, like ballistic missiles, fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or roughly 1 mile per second. Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their target. Russia reportedly fielded its first hypersonic weapons in December 2019, while some experts believe that China fielded hypersonic weapons as early as 2020. The United States is not expected to field hypersonic weapons before 2023. (For an overview of hypersonic weapons programs in Russia, China, and the United States, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.)

The maneuverability and low flight altitude of hypersonic weapons could challenge existing detection and defense systems. For example, most terrestrial-based radars cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in the weapon’s flight due to line-of-sight limitations of radar detection. This leaves minimal time for a defender to launch interceptors that could neutralize an inbound weapon. Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic weapons.

U.S. defense officials have stated that both existing terrestrial- and space-based sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons; former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin has noted that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”

Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

SDA developed the PWSA, formerly known as the National Defense Space Architecture, to “unify and integrate next generation capabilities across [the Department of Defense (DOD)] and industry.” The PWSA aims to be a “single, coherent proliferated space architecture with seven layers,” which include the data tracking and transport layers depicted in Figure 2 and discussed below. Other layers include the custody layer to support the targeting of mobile ground assets; the battle management layer to provide space-based command and control; the navigation layer to provide “alternate positioning, navigation, and timing for potential GPS-denied environments”; the deterrence layer to detect potentially hostile actions in deep space; and the support layer to facilitate satellite operations for the other PWSA layers. Once fully fielded, the PWSA is to include 550 satellites and provide full global coverage.

Tracking Layer

The tracking layer is to “provide global indications, warning, tracking, and targeting of advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems.” As part of this layer, SDA is developing an architecture of Wide Field of View (WFOV) satellites, which are to eventually provide global coverage. SDA requested $81.3 million for Tranche 0 tracking activities in FY2023 and $499.8 million for Tranche 1 tracking activities (also known as Resilient Missile Warning Missile Tracking – Low Earth Orbit).

Working in tandem with the SDA’s tracking satellites will be the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), previously known as the Space Sensor Layer, which is being developed by MDA in collaboration with SDA and the U.S. Space Force. HBTSS is to provide more sensitive, but more limited (or Medium Field of View [MFOV]) coverage, compared to WFOV. For this reason, WFOV is intended to provide cueing data to HBTSS, which could then provide more specific, target quality data to a ground-based interceptor. MDA requested $89.2 million for HBTSS in FY2023.

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