Author: U.S. Naval Institute Staff

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 4: Logistics

The following is the latest edition of the U.S. Marine Corps doctrinal publication, MCDP 4: Logistics. From the forward This doctrinal publication focuses on logistics. It describes the theory and philosophy of military logistics as practiced by the United States Marine Corps. It provides Marines a conceptual framework for understanding how logistics is an essential […]

The following is the latest edition of the U.S. Marine Corps doctrinal publication, MCDP 4: Logistics.

From the forward

This doctrinal publication focuses on logistics. It describes the theory and philosophy of military logistics as practiced by the United States Marine Corps. It provides Marines a conceptual framework for understanding how logistics is an essential aspect of every military operation. The Marine Corps’ view of logistics is based on our common understanding of the nature of war, our role in the joint force, and our warfighting philosophy as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting.

This publication is a revision of the 1997 version of MCDP 4, Logistics. It places the time-tested, combat-proven principles outlined in the previous version in an updated warfighting context. As General A. M. Gray wrote, “like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve.”

This publication describes the role of logistics in a globally contested environment, within multiple domains, across the competition continuum. Marines must be able to operate when logistics is contested, which requires us to consider logistics opportunities and limitations in both force and operational planning. Professionals across all Marine Corps occupational fields must find innovative ways to move and sustain forces, experiment with alternative support methods, and train to conduct logistics in realistic conditions as cohesive units. Increasingly persistent and global threats reinforce the need to leverage strategic- and operational-level logistics to support Marines.

This publication is intended for all Marines. Logistics is a part of every military activity. Therefore, all Marines benefit by understanding the nature, theories, and design of the logistics enterprise. The more Marines understand how their needs are met by a complex network of systems and relationships, the better they will be at creating realistic plans, generating requirements, and using the network to build, position, and sustain the force. This understanding also helps develop support plans that shape and extend the endurance, reach, and survivability of Marine Corps forces.

This publication has a similar construct to MCDP 1, Warfighting. It is not intended to be a reference manual. It is designed to be read from cover to cover, and to be immediately applicable. This publication does not address specific techniques or procedures we should adopt. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of ideas, with historical lessons and realistic fictional illustrations intended to stimulate thinking and encourage additional learning. Reading, studying, and debating this publication with fellow Marines will enhance our understanding about the essential role logistics holds in our ability to meet any warfighting challenge.

[signed]

David H. Berger
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Download the document here.

Report to Congress on Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine

The following is the March 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service report, Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress. From the report Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some defense analysts, U.S. defense officials, and Members of Congress have debated whether or not to enable the transfer of U.S. […]

The following is the March 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service report, Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress.

From the report

Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some defense analysts, U.S. defense officials, and Members of Congress have debated whether or not to enable the transfer of U.S. or NATO military aircraft, including fighter jets and unmanned aircraft, to Ukraine. In general, the debate has centered around two broad questions: (1) Is providing advanced military fighter jets to the Ukrainian air force necessary to helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression, and (2) if so, how much and what kinds of assistance, ranging from aircraft to maintenance to training, should the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide?

On one side of the debate, some analysts note that combat aircraft have not yet played a decisive role in the conflict and are unlikely to do so based on current Ukrainian and Russian capabilities. Both sides have employed advanced air defense systems that have limited the combat effects of Russian and Ukrainian aircraft. As a result, the conflict in Ukraine has evolved into a ground-centric, air denial conflict featuring precision strike capabilities, such as the U.S. M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). On the other side of the debate, proponents of transferring U.S. or NATO fighter jets to Ukraine claim that it may allow the Ukrainian military to address certain perceived gaps in operational capabilities, such as air superiority; suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.

Congress may evaluate a proposed transfer of U.S. or NATO fighter aircraft to Ukraine applying an “air denial” (deny Russia ability to use airpower) versus “air superiority” (help Ukraine overcome Russian air defenses and air power) comparison to an analysis of selected military mission areas. From this perspective, the military operating environment of the conflict has resulted in both sides adopting an air denial strategy rather than seeking air superiority. A central tactical purpose of using advanced fighter aircraft, especially in U.S. military doctrine, has been to achieve air superiority. Congress may consider whether it is best for U.S. security assistance seek to continue to provide air denial capability to Ukraine, or whether it would further U.S. interests to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces seeking air superiority. The outcome of such decisions may affect other mission areas, such as suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.

In evaluating whether it is in the U.S. interest to transfer U.S. or NATO military aircraft to Ukraine, Congress may consider several issues:

  • What are the hurdles and potential implications to Ukraine’s adaptation to fighting with advanced military aircraft? How long would it take Ukraine to fully adapt its security institutions to effectively fight with advanced military aircraft?
  • How quickly can Ukrainian personnel be trained on new systems?
  • Would Ukraine use a maintenance model where it trains its own personnel to do maintenance on advanced fighter aircraft, or a model where it uses international contract maintenance personnel? If the latter, for how long?
  • What types of munitions would the United States likely provide? Would transferring munitions for Ukrainian fighter aircraft impact the U.S. military’s ability to conduct air superiority operations elsewhere in the world?
  • Should the United States pay to transfer U.S.-manufactured fighter jets to Ukraine? Congress may consider options for how to finance such aircraft and who should fund their purchase.
  • If the United States or another NATO member chooses to transfer aircraft to Ukraine, should the aircraft be used, new, or a mix of both?
  • Should Congress support the provision of such aircraft by NATO allies, in addition to or as an alternative to U.S. provision?

Download document here.

USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: March 20, 2023

These are the approximate positions of the U.S. Navy’s deployed carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups throughout the world as of March 20, 2023, based on Navy and public data. In cases where a CSG or ARG is conducting disaggregated operations, the chart reflects the location of the capital ship. Ships Underway Total Battle […]

USNI News Graphic

These are the approximate positions of the U.S. Navy’s deployed carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups throughout the world as of March 20, 2023, based on Navy and public data. In cases where a CSG or ARG is conducting disaggregated operations, the chart reflects the location of the capital ship.

Ships Underway

Total Battle Force Deployed Underway
296
(USS 238, USNS 58)		 107
(USS 72, USNS 35)		  80
(52 Deployed, 28 Local)

Ships Deployed by Fleet

2nd Fleet 3rd Fleet 4th Fleet 5th Fleet 6th Fleet 7th Fleet Total
4 1 2 10 23 67 107

In Yokosuka, Japan

Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Tristan Duvall, from New Philadelphia, Ohio, secures radio wires to a radio tower aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), while in-port Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, March 14. 2023. US Navy Photo

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) is in port in Yokosuka, Japan.

In the East China Sea

MV-22B Ospreys, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 362 (Rein.), 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, embarked aboard the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, prepare to take off from the flight deck of the forward-deployed amphibious assault carrier USS America (LHA-6) during forward arming and refueling ship (FARS) operations while sailing in the East China Sea, Mar. 16, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked, is in the East China Sea – just outside the sea of Japan. USS Makin Island (LHD-8), the flagship of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, left Naval Base San Diego on Nov. 9 for a deployment to the Indo-Pacific.

The ARG includes Makin Island and amphibious transport docks USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26) and USS Anchorage (LPD-23). During the deployment to the Western Pacific, the ARG has worked with other U.S. assets, including Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 21, P-8A Poseidon aircraft and personnel from U.S. 7th Fleet and CTF 72, 73, 75, 76/3, Destroyer Squadron 7 and Amphibious Squadron 7. Task Force 76/3 was recently formed as a result of merging the staffs of the Navy’s TF 76 and the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The MEU includes the aviation combat element with the “Flying Leathernecks” of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 122 flying F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters and the “Ugly Angels” of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 362 (Reinforced) flying MV-22B Ospreys; the Battalion Landing team of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines; and Combat Logistics Battalion 13 making up the logistics combat element.

In the Philippine Sea

Navy Sailor launches an aircraft from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on March 18, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is underway in the Philippine Sea. The Nimitz CSG deployed from the West Coast on Dec. 3 and chopped into U.S. 7th Fleet on Dec. 16. The Nimitz CSG was featured on CBS 60 Minutes on Sunday night.

Carrier Strike Group 11

Sailors secure fuel lines during a replenishment-at-sea aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on March 20, 2023. US Navy Photo

Aircraft carrier

USS Nimitz (CVN-68), homeported in Bremerton, Wash.

Carrier Air Wing 17

An F/A-18E Super Hornet from the ‘Blue Diamonds’ of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 146 makes an arrested landing on the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on March 18, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17, based at Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif., is embarked aboard Nimitz and includes a total of nine squadrons and detachments:

  • The “Fighting Redcocks” of VFA-22 Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) flying F/A-18Fs from Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif.
  • The “Mighty Shrikes” of VFA-94 – F/A-18F – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Kestrels” of VFA-137 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Blue Diamonds” of VFA 146 – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Cougars” of VAQ-139 – EA-18G – Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) – from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.
  • The “Sun Kings” of VAW-116 – E-2D – Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) – from Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Calif.
  • The “Providers” of VRC-30 – C-2A – Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) – from Naval Air Station North Island, Calif.
  • The “Indians” of HSC-6 – MH-60S – Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) – from Naval Air Station North Island.
  • The “Battle Cats” of HSM-73 – MH-60R – Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) – from Naval Air Station North Island.

Cruiser

USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), homeported at Naval Station San Diego, Calif.

Destroyer Squadron 9

Seaman Kenneth Leone, from Franklinton, N.C., prepares to raise the safety nets following flight quarters aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur (DDG-73) on March 17, 2023. US Navy Photo

Destroyer Squadron 9 is based in Everett, Wash., and is embarked on Nimitz.

  • USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108), homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
  • USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93), homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor.
  • USS Decatur (DDG-73), homeported at Naval Station San Diego, Calif.
  • USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60), homeported at Naval Station San Diego.

In Manilla, Philippines

A F-35B Lightning II, assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 122, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, embarked aboard the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group taxis on the flight deck of the forward-deployed amphibious assault carrier USS America (LHA-6) during forward arming and refueling ship (FARS) operations while sailing in the East China Sea, Mar. 16, 2023. US Navy Photo

The America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are in the Surigao Strait. The ARG made a port call in Manila over the weekend and was in port as of Monday. The annual Balikatan exercise with the Philippines is scheduled to start April 11.

The America ARG consists of USS America (LHA-6), Amphibious Squadron 11 and USS Green Bay (LPD-20).

In the Ionian Sea

Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W Bush (CVN-77) transits the Adriatic Sea on March 17, 2023. US Navy Photo

Having completed a port call in Souda Bay, Crete last week, the George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is in the Ionian Sea.

Carrier Strike Group 1

F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft, both attached to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7, chained to the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) as the ship, along with the embarked staff of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 10, departs Souda Bay, Crete, following a scheduled port visit, March 16, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier

USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), homeported in Norfolk, Va.

Carrier Air Wing 7

Cmdr. Robert Whitmore, commander, Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 121, conducts a preflight inspection before a change of command ceremony aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), March 17, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7, based on Naval Air Station Oceana, Va., is embarked on Bush and includes:

  • The “Pukin’ Dogs” of VFA-143 Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) flying F/A-18Es from Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.
  • The “Jolly Rogers” of VFA-103 – F/A-18F – from Naval Air Station Oceana.
  • The “Sidewinders” of VFA-86 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif.
  • The “Knighthawks” of VFA-136 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Patriots” of VAQ-140 – EA-18G – Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) – from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.
  • The “Bluetails” of VAW-121 – E-2D – Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va.
  • The “Rawhides” of VRC-40 – Detachment – C-2A – Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VRC) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk.
  • The “Nightdippers” of HSC-5 – MH-60S – Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk.
  • The “Grandmasters” of HSM-46 – MH-60R – Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) – from Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla.

Cruiser

USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Va.

Destroyer Squadron

Sailors assigned to the guided-missile destroyer USS Truxtun (DDG-103) heave line while pulling into Aqaba, Jordan during International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express 2023, March 7, 2023. US Navy Photo

Destroyer Squadron 26 is based in Norfolk and is embarked on the carrier. The following ships deployed with the strike group.

  • USS Delbert D. Black (DDG-119), homeported at Naval Station Mayport, Fla.
  • USS Truxtun (DDG-103), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk.
  • USS Farragut (DDG-99), homeported at Naval Station Mayport.
  • USS Nitze (DDG-94), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk.

In the Western Atlantic

An E/A-18G Growler attached to the ‘Gray Wolves’ of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 142, flies by the island of the first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) on March 14, 2023. US Navy Photo

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) left Naval Station Norfolk on March 2 for its Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), a month-long graduation exercise before the crew, Carrier Air Wing 8, its escorts and Carrier Strike Group 12 are certified for worldwide deployment.

In the Eastern Pacific

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) transits Puget Sound after departing Bremerton, Wash., March 17, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is underway in the Southern California Operating Areas. The CSG will be the first to put to sea with key elements of Project Overmatch that will support the joint tactical network of the future.

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) is underway in the Eastern Pacific off the coast of Northern California. Theodore Roosevelt left Bremerton, Wash., on March 17 and is conducting a change of homeport to San Diego following an 18-month docking planned incremental availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.

In addition to these major formations, not shown are others serving in submarines, individual surface ships, aircraft squadrons, SEALs, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, Seabees, Coast Guard cutters, EOD Mobile Units and more serving throughout the globe.

Report on National Security Implications of 5G Networks

The following is the March 14, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies.  From the report The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial […]

The following is the March 14, 2023 Congressional Research Service In Focus report, National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies. 

From the report

The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control (C2); and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.

Download the document here.

Fiscal Year 2024 Department of the Navy Budget Materials

The following are the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2024 budget summary materials released this week. From the report America is a maritime nation. American naval primacy is essential to meeting the challenges we face today. The seas are the lifeblood of our economy, our national security, and our way of life. With 90 […]

The following are the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2024 budget summary materials released this week.

From the report

America is a maritime nation. American naval primacy is essential to meeting the challenges we face today. The seas are the lifeblood of our economy, our national security, and our way of life. With 90 percent of global commerce traveling by sea, the Department of the Navy safeguards the world’s economy from hostile nations and organizations that threaten international waters. Our everyday lives also depend on access to the internet, which rides upon the security of undersea fiber optic cables. Our prosperity as a nation and our security are dependent upon unfettered access to the seas. The Department of the Navy harnesses our ships, submarines, aircraft, unmanned platforms, and highly trained Sailors and Marines, to protect and support the American way of life.

In both times of peace and war, the Department can be found in and on the sea, the air, space, ground, and in the cyber realm so that our citizens can remain prosperous and secure. The Department’s track record of keeping America safe is so sound that most Americans cannot recall a time in their lives when they feared attack from another nation’s naval force. We keep threats away from our shores by operating abroad.

Today and every day you can find nearly 100 ships and submarines underway around the globe. There is no substitute for presence. If fact, section 8062(a) of title 10, United States Code, was amended for the Navy to prepare for “peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States.” When we consistently deploy our combat ready forces alongside our allies and partners in faraway waters, our adversaries are forced to face a persistent reality – a fight with American naval forces would be unwinnable and costly. Our mere presence and routine operations bolster our leverage, giving us diplomatic options that will always be more favorable than war.

In times of international crises, we can quickly maneuver thousands of miles with the world’s more capable warships and dwell in areas of interest without relying on land bases in foreign countries. When called upon, the U.S. Navy ships are ready to deploy the world’s most sophisticated weapons systems operated by highly skilled personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. The disregard for international rules from the People’s Republic of China continues to grow while Russia expands its aggression in Europe. America’s naval forces are unique as America’s most timely, flexible, and forward-deployed force across the full spectrum of challenges — from naval diplomacy to strategic deterrence, to resource competition, to crisis, and conflict.

Maintaining a world-class and worldwide deployable Navy and Marine Corps as a first line of defense for the United States is not something that can be created overnight when conflict arises. Investing in the Navy and Marine Corps today is a down payment on America’s security tomorrow. Our Navy and Marine Corps integrate resources across disparate domains and elements of national power to deter adversaries and campaign forward.

The Department’s budget request supports the nation’s priorities, driven by a hierarchy of strategic doctrines: National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy (NDS), Secretary of the Navy’s Strategic Priorities, Chief of Naval Operations’ Navigation Plan, and Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030.

The FY 2024 President’s Budget (PB24) prioritizes readiness, capability, and capacity, especially investment and readiness efforts, to make sure our ships and aircraft are always prepared to deploy. This approach will deliver the integrated deterrence at sea required by the NDS. The budget reflects consistent priorities of: Columbia Nuclear strategic deterrence, readiness, modernization/capabilities, capable capacity in order to implement the NDS, and builds on Force Design initiatives.

Download the document here.

Report to Congress on Marines’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle

The following is the March 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). From the report Background The Marine Corps describes the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) as The Corps’ next-generation vehicle designed to move Marines from ship to shore. Designed to replace the Corps’ aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle […]

The following is the March 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV).

From the report

Background

The Marine Corps describes the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) as The Corps’ next-generation vehicle designed to move Marines from ship to shore. Designed to replace the Corps’ aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), which has been in service since 1972, the ACV will be the primary means of tactical mobility for the Marine infantry battalion at sea and ashore. The ACV will have the capability to provide organic, direct fire support to dismounted infantry in the attack.

There are currently four ACV variants planned: (1) a Personnel Variant (ACV-P), which can carry three crewmembers with 13 Marines and two days of combat equipment and supplies; (2) a Command and Control Variant (ACV-C); (3) a Recovery Variant; and (4) a 30-mm Gun Variant. The Marines intend for the ACV to provide effective land and tactical water mobility (ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore), precise supporting fires, and high levels of force protection intended to protect against blasts, fragmentation, and kinetic energy threats.

The ACV program delivered initial ACV-P variants in November 2020 and delivered initial ACV-C variants in FY2022. Plans call for delivery of Improved Lethality 30-mm Gun Variant ACVs in FY2025 and Recovery Variants in FY2026.

Current Program Status

In June 2018, the ACV entered Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) with BAE Systems selected for the first 30 vehicles to be delivered in fall 2019. In November 2020, the ACV achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC). In December 2020, a Full-Rate Production (FRP) decision was reportedly made by the Marine Corps after having been delayed from September 2020 due to issues related to Coronavirus Disease 2019. The current planned acquisition objective of 632 ACVs would replace AAVs in Assault Amphibian Battalions. The previous acquisition objective of 1,122 ACVs was reduced in accordance with Marine Corps Force Design 2030 modernization efforts (see CRS Insight IN11281, New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Force Design 2030, by Andrew Feickert).

Full-Rate Production Contract

On March 6, 2023, BAE reported it had received its third full-rate production ACV contract for $256.8 million. Under this contract, BAE will produce both ACV Personnel and ACV Command variants. BAE reports ACV production and support is taking place at BAE locations in Stafford, VA; Jose, CA; Sterling Heights, MI; Aiken, SC; and York, PA.

Initial Operational Testing Observations

During Marine Corps initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) conducted from June to September 2020, the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) noted:

  • The ACV demonstrated water mobility and the ability to self-deploy from the beach, cross the surf zone, enter the ocean, and embark aboard amphibious shipping. The infantry rifle company equipped with the ACV was able to deploy from amphibious shipping, maneuver on the beach, and conduct subsequent offensive and defensive operations ashore.
  • While the ACV demonstrated good operational availability and maintainability during IOT&E, it did not meet its 69-hour mean time between operational mission failures (MTBOMF) threshold. The government-furnished Remote Weapons System (RWS)—an internally controlled, exterior-mounted MK 19 automatic grenade launcher or M2 .50 caliber heavy machine gun was the source of the largest number of operational mission failures (OMFs).
  • The ACV accommodated three crew and 13 embarked infantry. Due to the placement and number of blast mitigating seats, interior space within the ACV is limited, making rapid ingress and egress difficult.
  • Infantry Marines noted that the troop seats were not contoured to fit body armor configurations, leading to discomfort during long-range ship-to-objective missions.

Reportedly, the Marines initiated corrective actions after the DOT&E report was published. In September 2021, the Marines suspended amphibious use of the ACV due to towing mechanism problems. In November 2021, the Marines began testing modifications to the towing mechanism in order to resume amphibious operations once the problem was rectified. Reportedly, in early 2022 after fixing the towing mechanism, the Marines began amphibious operational training with ACVs, including crew certification and training on a number of new safety-related procedures.

Download the document here.

Australian Report on AUKUS Nuclear Powered Submarine Pathway

The following is the March 13, 2023, Australian Department of Defense report, The AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway. From the report Over the past 18 months, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have worked together to determine the Optimal Pathway for Australia to acquire SSNs. All three AUKUS partners have dedicated significant effort and […]

The following is the March 13, 2023, Australian Department of Defense report, The AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway.

From the report

Over the past 18 months, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have worked together to determine the Optimal Pathway for Australia to acquire SSNs. All three AUKUS partners have dedicated significant effort and resources to this work. A Joint Steering Group made up of senior officials from all three countries met 12 times between December 2021 and February 2023. The Joint Steering Group examined the full suite of options for Australia’s SSN acquisition, assessing the opportunities, risks and requirements of each.

Based on the work of the Joint Steering Group, AUKUS partners have identified a phased Pathway that delivers a sovereign Australian SSN capability as early as the early 2030s. The Pathway will see the construction and delivery of SSN-AUKUS as an enduring SSN capability for Australia and the UK – incorporating technology from all three nations, including cutting edge US submarine technologies.

This Pathway includes:

  • Beginning in 2023, Australian military and civilian personnel will embed with the UK Royal Navy, the US Navy and – subject to any necessary arrangements – with UK and US submarine industrial bases.
  • Beginning in 2023 and 2026 respectively, the US and UK will increase SSN port visits to Australia.
  • As early as 2027, UK and US SSNs plan to establish a rotational presence in Western Australia.
  • Pending US Congressional approval, from the early 2030s the US intends to sell Australia three Virginia class submarines, with the potential to sell up to two more if needed. This will ensure there is no capability gap during the retirement of Australia’s existing diesel-electric submarine fleet.

Importantly, the Pathway includes milestones for Australia to establish the capabilities to safely operate and steward SSNs. The UK and the US will use their extensive experience in safely constructing, operating, maintaining and disposing of SSNs to assist Australia in achieving those milestones.

The Pathway will develop Australia’s capacity to achieve the ‘sovereign ready’ milestone to safely and responsibly own, operate, maintain and regulate a sovereign SSN capability. The phases of the Pathway will enhance trilateral undersea presence in the region in the near term, and will build this ‘sovereign ready’ capability over time. Ultimately, the Pathway will provide Australia with the capacity to build and deliver its enduring nuclear-powered submarine capability – the SSN-AUKUS. SSN-AUKUS will be the future submarine for both Australia and the UK, with the technology developed from and integrated into this platform benefitting all AUKUS partners. Australia and the UK will begin to build SSN-AUKUS in their domestic shipyards before the end of this decade. The UK intends to deliver its first SSN-AUKUS as early as the late 2030s. Australia plans to deliver the first Australian-built SSN-AUKUS in the early 2040s.

Download the document here.

USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: March 13, 2023

These are the approximate positions of the U.S. Navy’s deployed carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups throughout the world as of March 13, 2023, based on Navy and public data. In cases where a CSG or ARG is conducting disaggregated operations, the chart reflects the location of the capital ship. Ships Underway Total Battle […]

USNI News Graphic

These are the approximate positions of the U.S. Navy’s deployed carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups throughout the world as of March 13, 2023, based on Navy and public data. In cases where a CSG or ARG is conducting disaggregated operations, the chart reflects the location of the capital ship.

Ships Underway

Total Battle Force Deployed Underway
296
(USS 238, USNS 58)		 108
(USS 73, USNS 35)		  65
(47 Deployed, 18 Local)

Ships Deployed by Fleet

2nd Fleet 3rd Fleet 4th Fleet 5th Fleet 6th Fleet 7th Fleet Total
4 2 2 10 23 67 108

In Yokosuka, Japan

Electronics Technician 3rd Class Myles Shema, from Lynchburg, Va., performs paint preservation on a precision approach landing platform on the flight deck of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), while in-port Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, March 6, 2023. US Navy Photo

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) is in port in Yokosuka, Japan.

In Okinawa, Japan

A Japan Ground Self-Defense Force soldier, with the 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, observes the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) during a simulated bilateral casualty pick up in the Philippine Sea, March 10, 2023. US Marine Corps Photo

The America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are in Okinawa, Japan, having completed exercises with the JMSDF and the Iron Fist 23 Exercise between the Marine Corps and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF).

The America ARG consists of USS America (LHA-6), Amphibious Squadron 11 and USS Green Bay (LPD-20).

In the Western Pacific

Navy Aviation Structural Mechanic 3rd Class Austin Whitehead, from Cottonwood, Ala., services the main rotor head on an MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter from the ‘Battlecats’ of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 73 on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on March 10, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is underway in the Western Pacific. The Nimitz CSG deployed from the West Coast on Dec. 3 and chopped into U.S. 7th Fleet on Dec. 16.

Carrier Strike Group 11

Navy Aviation Structural Mechanic (Safety Equipment) Airman Christopher Harris, from Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., coils a line in the hangar bay aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) during a replenishment-at-sea on March 9, 2023. US Navy Photo

Aircraft carrier
USS Nimitz (CVN-68), homeported in Bremerton, Wash.

Carrier Air Wing 17

Navy Chief Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Equipment) Laura Quintero, from Chicago, monitors flight operations on the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on March 7, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17, based at Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif., is embarked aboard Nimitz and includes a total of nine squadrons and detachments:

  • The “Fighting Redcocks” of VFA-22 Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) flying F/A-18Fs from Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif.
  • The “Mighty Shrikes” of VFA-94 – F/A-18F – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Kestrels” of VFA-137 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Blue Diamonds” of VFA 146 – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Cougars” of VAQ-139 – EA-18G – Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) – from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.
  • The “Sun Kings” of VAW-116 – E-2D – Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) – from Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Calif.
  • The “Providers” of VRC-30 – C-2A – Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) – from Naval Air Station North Island, Calif.
  • The “Indians” of HSC-6 – MH-60S – Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) – from Naval Air Station North Island.
  • The “Battle Cats” of HSM-73 – MH-60R – Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) – from Naval Air Station North Island.

Cruiser
USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), homeported at Naval Station San Diego, Calif.

Destroyer Squadron 9

Navy Gunner’s Mate 3rd Class Colten Groessl, from Queen Creek, Ariz., stands watch in the combat information center aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108). US Navy Photo

Destroyer Squadron 9 is based in Everett, Wash., and is embarked on Nimitz.

  • USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108), homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
  • USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93), homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor.
  • USS Decatur (DDG-73), homeported at Naval Station San Diego, Calif.
  • USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60), homeported at Naval Station San Diego.

In the South China Sea

Amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD-8) transits the Gulf of Thailand during exercise Cobra Gold 2023, March 3, 2023. US Navy Photo

The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked, completed Cobra Gold 2023 on March 10. The ARG/MEU completed a port call in Laem Chabang, Thailand, and is now in the South China Sea. USS Makin Island (LHD-8), the flagship of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, left Naval Base San Diego on Nov. 9 for a deployment to the Indo-Pacific.

The ARG includes Makin Island and amphibious transport docks USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26) and USS Anchorage (LPD-23). During the deployment to the Western Pacific, the ARG has worked with other U.S. assets, including Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 21, P-8A Poseidon aircraft and personnel from U.S. 7th Fleet and CTF 72, 73, 75, 76/3, Destroyer Squadron 7 and Amphibious Squadron 7. Task Force 76/3 was recently formed as a result of merging the staffs of the Navy’s TF 76 and the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The MEU includes the aviation combat element with the “Flying Leathernecks” of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 122 flying F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters and the “Ugly Angels” of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 362 (Reinforced) flying MV-22B Ospreys; the Battalion Landing team of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines; and Combat Logistics Battalion 13 making up the logistics combat element.

In Souda Bay, Crete

Cmdr. Karrie Lang, Combat Systems Officer aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), takes a selfie with Tom Cruise during a visit to the ship, March 3, 2023. US Navy Photo

The George H. W. Bush Carrier Strike Group (CSG) arrived in Souda Bay, Crete, on March 10.

“Top Gun” and “Top Gun: Maverick” star Tom Cruise visited aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush for three days (March 1-3) in the Adriatic Sea to film scenes for “Mission: Impossible – Dead Reckoning Part Two.”

Carrier Strike Group 1

Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), along with the embarked staff of Carrier Strike Group 10, arrives in Souda Bay, Crete, for a scheduled port visit, March 10, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), homeported in Norfolk, Va.

Carrier Air Wing 7

An F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft, attached to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7, performs a flyover of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) during a change of command ceremony, March 8, 2023. US Navy Photo

Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7, based on Naval Air Station Oceana, Va., is embarked on Bush and includes:

  • The “Pukin’ Dogs” of VFA-143 Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) flying F/A-18Es from Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.
  • The “Jolly Rogers” of VFA-103 – F/A-18F – from Naval Air Station Oceana.
  • The “Sidewinders” of VFA-86 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif.
  • The “Knighthawks” of VFA-136 – F/A-18E – from Naval Air Station Lemoore.
  • The “Patriots” of VAQ-140 – EA-18G – Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) – from Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.
  • The “Bluetails” of VAW-121 – E-2D – Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va.
  • The “Rawhides” of VRC-40 – Detachment – C-2A – Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VRC) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk.
  • The “Nightdippers” of HSC-5 – MH-60S – Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) – from Naval Air Station Norfolk.
  • The “Grandmasters” of HSM-46 – MH-60R – Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) – from Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla.

Cruiser
USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Va.

Destroyer Squadron

Sailors aboard an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Nitze (DDG-94), man the rails as the ship arrives in Valletta, Malta, March 11, 2023. US Navy Photo

Destroyer Squadron 26 is based in Norfolk and is embarked on the carrier. The following ships deployed with the strike group.

  • USS Delbert D. Black (DDG-119), homeported at Naval Station Mayport, Fla.
  • USS Truxtun (DDG-103), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk.
  • USS Farragut (DDG-99), homeported at Naval Station Mayport.
  • USS Nitze (DDG-94), homeported at Naval Station Norfolk.

In the Western Atlantic


USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) are underway in the Western Atlantic.

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) left Naval Station Norfolk on March 2 for its Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) – a month-long graduation exercise before the crew, Carrier Air Wing 8, its escorts and Carrier Strike Group 12 are certified for worldwide deployment.

In addition to these major formations, not shown are others serving in submarines, individual surface ships, aircraft squadrons, SEALs, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, Seabees, Coast Guard cutters, EOD Mobile Units and more serving throughout the globe.

GAO Report on Weapon Sustainment

The following is the March 2023 Government Accountability Office study, Weapons Systems Sustainment: DOD Needs to Improve Its Reporting for Warehousing Pilot Program. From the report The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 authorized a 6-year pilot program for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to provide storage and distribution services for weapon […]

The following is the March 2023 Government Accountability Office study, Weapons Systems Sustainment: DOD Needs to Improve Its Reporting for Warehousing Pilot Program.

From the report

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 authorized a 6-year pilot program for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to provide storage and distribution services for weapon system contractors. Specifically, the Department of Defense (DOD) was authorized to enter into no more than five contracts for contractors to use DLA’s warehouses to store and distribute weapon system parts. DOD was also required to submit a report by the end of 2021 describing the cost-effectiveness of the pilot program and how the warehousing contracts affected the contractors’ ability to meet the requirements of their existing contracts to support weapon systems sustainment. DOD issued its report to Congress in March 2021 and recommended the pilot program be made permanent and expanded to non-weapon systems. DOD further submitted a legislative proposal for the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2023 for Congress to enact its recommendations. The James M. Inhofe NDAA for Fiscal Year 2023 extended the pilot program for an additional year.

GAO found that DOD’s report did not fully assess the cost-effectiveness of the pilot program. DOD guidance establishes seven elements that must be addressed for a complete cost-effectiveness analysis. GAO found that DOD substantially addressed one, partially addressed five, and did not address one element. For example, DOD’s report provided some cost information for three existing contracts in the pilot program. However, the report included projected rather than actual costs, and did not fully evaluate alternatives. DOD officials told GAO that they were not aware of DOD’s guidance identifying the elements of a complete cost-effectiveness analysis and did not use other relevant guidance. By applying the guidance and conducting a complete cost-effectiveness analysis, DOD can help ensure that Congress has the information it needs to evaluate the costs and benefits of the pilot program.

DOD’s report did not comprehensively assess how the warehousing contracts affected contractors’ ability to meet the requirements of their existing primary contracts. For example, DOD’s report described contractor’s views but did not include any supporting data or information. The report also did not include challenges described to GAO by stakeholders managing these contracts. Without this assessment, DOD may not have complete information on the potential effects of these contracts to inform congressional decisions about the pilot program.

Why GAO Did This Study
DLA is DOD’s largest logistics combat support agency. It operates 400 warehouses to, among other things, store and distribute parts for producing and repairing weapon systems. The military services and their weapon system contractors have used commercial warehouses to store inventory that were in close proximity to DLA’s distribution centers,
potentially incurring higher costs and longer delivery times in doing so.

Section 883 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 authorized a 6-year pilot program for DLA to provide storage and distribution services for weapon systems contractors. Section 883 also required DOD to report on the program
and included a provision for GAO to review the report for sufficiency. This review addresses the extent to
which DOD’s report assessed (1) the cost-effectiveness of the program and (2) whether the support contracts
affected contractors’ ability to meet the requirements of their existing primary contracts. GAO reviewed DOD’s report
and compared it to required elements in the mandate, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends
GAO made three recommendations, including that DOD perform a complete cost-effectiveness analysis and assess how support contracts may affect contractors’ ability to meet their requirements under the primary contracts. DOD concurred with these recommendations.

Download document here.

Pentagon’s Joint Concept for Competing

The following is the Feb. 10, 2023, Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Concept for Competing. From the report EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Based on combatant commander (CCDR) assessments of their limited ability to compete successfully in strategic competition, at a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Tank on 19 June 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs […]

The following is the Feb. 10, 2023, Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Concept for Competing.

From the report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Based on combatant commander (CCDR) assessments of their limited ability to compete successfully in strategic competition, at a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Tank on 19 June 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the development of a joint concept for competition to drive joint strategic planning and joint force development and design. The Joint Concept for Competing (JCC) advances an intellectual paradigm shift to enable the Joint Force, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners, to engage successfully in strategic competition. For the purposes of this concept, strategic competition is a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other. The normal and peaceful competition among allies, strategic partners, and other international actors who are not potentially hostile is outside the scope of this concept.

The Strategic Environment
Recognizing the overwhelming conventional military capability demonstrated during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, U.S. adversaries responded by seeking to circumvent U.S. deterrent posture through competitive activity below the threshold of armed conflict with the United States. Adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power to expand the competitive space. Adversaries aim to achieve their strategic objectives through a myriad of ways and means, including statecraft and economic power as well as subversion, coercion, disinformation, and deception. They are investing in key technologies designed to offset U.S. strategic and conventional military capabilities (e.g., nuclear weapons, anti-access and area denial systems, offensive cyberspace, artificial intelligence, hypersonic delivery systems, electromagnetic spectrum). Simply put, our adversaries intend to “win without fighting,” but they are also building military forces that strengthen their ability to “fight and win” an armed conflict against the United States. Facing this dilemma, more of the same is not enough. By ignoring the threat of strategic competition, and failing to compete deliberately and proactively, the United States risks ceding strategic
influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for a war that may never occur. The United States must remain fully prepared and poised for war, but this alone is insufficient to secure U.S. strategic interests. If the Joint Force does not change its approach to strategic competition, there is a significant risk that the United States will “lose without fighting.”

Purpose of Strategic Competition
Analyzing any adversary’s way of war is instructive. As former CJCS General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, “We think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.” They believe they are in a long-term “conflict without combat” to alter the current international system, advance their national interests, gain strategic advantage and influence, and limit U.S. and allied options. The JCC postulates that the Joint Force should also view the spectrum of conflict as an enduring struggle between international actors with incompatible strategic interests and objectives, but who also cooperate when their interests coincide.

Strategic competition is thus an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.

The Military Challenge
How should the Joint Force, in conjunction with interorganizational partners, compete in support of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to protect and advance U.S. national interests, while simultaneously deterring aggression, countering adversary competitive strategies, and
preparing for armed conflict should deterrence and competition fail to protect vital U.S. national interests?

The Central Idea
This central idea of the JCC requires that the Joint Force expand its competitive mindset and its competitive approaches. A Joint Force with a competitive mindset will view strategic competition as a complex set of interactions in which the Joint Force contributes to broader USG efforts to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over other actors and ultimately to achieve favorable strategic outcomes. In conjunction with its interorganizational partners, the Joint Force can create competitive opportunities by using military capabilities to proactively probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities; establish behavioral patterns joint forces can exploit in a crisis to conceal U.S. intentions until it is too late to respond to them effectively; shift the competition to sub-areas in which the United States can exploit its advantages, leverage, and initiative; and attempt to divert adversaries’ attention and resources to sub-areas of secondary or tertiary importance to the United States.

Download the document here.