Category: Russia

U.S. Needs Air Superiority, Ship-Killing Weapons to Defend Taiwan, Pacific Air Forces Commander Says

The ability to sink Chinese warships armed with surface-to-air missiles is critical to defending Taiwan, the Air Force’s top officer for the Pacific said Tuesday. “We need better weapons to attrit those ships,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said. He noted that China’s angry response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) visit to Taiwan last summer included […]

Soldiers from a M110A2 self-propelled artillery squad from the Republic of China (Taiwan) Army. CNA Photo

The ability to sink Chinese warships armed with surface-to-air missiles is critical to defending Taiwan, the Air Force’s top officer for the Pacific said Tuesday.
“We need better weapons to attrit those ships,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said. He noted that China’s angry response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) visit to Taiwan last summer included encircling Taiwan with warships as a demonstration of its anti-access, area denial capability.

“One thing that people often don’t think about with respect to air superiority is weapons to be able to kill ships,” Wilsbach said, speaking during an online session with the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute.

He also advocated for advanced radars positioned east of Taiwan.

He pointed to Russia’s problems in Ukraine, both in logistics and in the ground battle since it lacks superiority in the air. He added that an amphibious invasion, which China would have to undertake against Taiwan, is far more difficult than crossing a land border.

Air superiority, “which wasn’t there, resulted in so much loss of life,” he said. Wilsbach estimated Russian casualties at 100,000 since the war began in February 2022.

Wilsbach said that if the Pacific Air Forces had an additional dollar, he’d spend it on air superiority. He mentioned more F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighters that allies Japan and Australia also fly, advanced semi-autonomous drones similar to Canberra’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat, the stealthy B-21 bomber and better aerial intelligence surveillance with the E-7 Wedgetail as systems to meet that goal. Further out would come the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, a sixth-generation manned aircraft to succeed the F-22.

Although China’s leadership has “a hard time getting past their obsession with Taiwan,” Wilsbach said he doesn’t think China wants to engage in this fight. “Certainly, Taiwan doesn’t,” he added. He said attrition in any conflict with China would reach levels on all sides “more closely paralleling World War II.”

To deter China’s ambitions, the Air Force “is looking for as many airfields where we can disperse the force” and locations to pre-position equipment and fuel across the Pacific. The command is also addressing “the tyranny of distance” problem that the region poses for logistics to continue operations after an attack. Wilsbach highlighted American fighter jets returning to Clark Air Base in the Philippines as an example of dispersed operations. He noted that this was the first time fifth-generation F-22 stealth fighters had landed there. The two planes belong to the 525th Fighter Squadron at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.

The landings demonstrate the impact of the expanded treaty basing arrangements that the U.S. has with the Philippines. Rehabilitation started on runways at Baca as part of the agreement covering three other installations to expand U.S. presence in the South China Sea, USNI News reported earlier this week.

Wilsbach said the Fiscal Year 2023 budget has provided money “to expand runways, ramp space and weapons and fuel storage” to a more dispersed force.

Like the Marine Corps and Navy, the Air Force is looking to spread its operations over wider areas under its Agile Combat Employment program. Wilsbach added that Japan and Australia are distributing their forces to different locations to complicate any enemy’s attack planning. The Air Force is also working with the Army on missile and hypersonic defenses for dispersed operations.

“They realize with precision guided munitions you’re not going to be able to be based [on] a very large base when attacked” and continue to operate as before. He said there is funding in the FY 2024 budget to continue developing solutions for those attacks, including rapid runway repair. He mentioned a quick-drying concrete that allows them to be “ready for operations in three hours.”

“Construction, that’s happening. Prepositioning, that’s happening,” Wilsbach said.

“Allies and partners are very interested” in information sharing about their capabilities and available assets. He said they bring significant electronic warfare capabilities and cyber and space strengths to a potential conflict.

This sharing among allies and with the other services extend to exercises like COPE North. This year’s drill involves the American, Japanese and Australian air forces operating from a number of bases, as well as aircraft from France.

“Exercising on a very frequent basis helps us to be interoperable,” he said.

Report to Congress on Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine

The following is the March 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service report, Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress. From the report Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some defense analysts, U.S. defense officials, and Members of Congress have debated whether or not to enable the transfer of U.S. […]

The following is the March 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service report, Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine: Issues and Options for Congress.

From the report

Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some defense analysts, U.S. defense officials, and Members of Congress have debated whether or not to enable the transfer of U.S. or NATO military aircraft, including fighter jets and unmanned aircraft, to Ukraine. In general, the debate has centered around two broad questions: (1) Is providing advanced military fighter jets to the Ukrainian air force necessary to helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression, and (2) if so, how much and what kinds of assistance, ranging from aircraft to maintenance to training, should the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide?

On one side of the debate, some analysts note that combat aircraft have not yet played a decisive role in the conflict and are unlikely to do so based on current Ukrainian and Russian capabilities. Both sides have employed advanced air defense systems that have limited the combat effects of Russian and Ukrainian aircraft. As a result, the conflict in Ukraine has evolved into a ground-centric, air denial conflict featuring precision strike capabilities, such as the U.S. M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). On the other side of the debate, proponents of transferring U.S. or NATO fighter jets to Ukraine claim that it may allow the Ukrainian military to address certain perceived gaps in operational capabilities, such as air superiority; suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.

Congress may evaluate a proposed transfer of U.S. or NATO fighter aircraft to Ukraine applying an “air denial” (deny Russia ability to use airpower) versus “air superiority” (help Ukraine overcome Russian air defenses and air power) comparison to an analysis of selected military mission areas. From this perspective, the military operating environment of the conflict has resulted in both sides adopting an air denial strategy rather than seeking air superiority. A central tactical purpose of using advanced fighter aircraft, especially in U.S. military doctrine, has been to achieve air superiority. Congress may consider whether it is best for U.S. security assistance seek to continue to provide air denial capability to Ukraine, or whether it would further U.S. interests to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces seeking air superiority. The outcome of such decisions may affect other mission areas, such as suppression of enemy air defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and counter-land (air-to-ground) capabilities.

In evaluating whether it is in the U.S. interest to transfer U.S. or NATO military aircraft to Ukraine, Congress may consider several issues:

  • What are the hurdles and potential implications to Ukraine’s adaptation to fighting with advanced military aircraft? How long would it take Ukraine to fully adapt its security institutions to effectively fight with advanced military aircraft?
  • How quickly can Ukrainian personnel be trained on new systems?
  • Would Ukraine use a maintenance model where it trains its own personnel to do maintenance on advanced fighter aircraft, or a model where it uses international contract maintenance personnel? If the latter, for how long?
  • What types of munitions would the United States likely provide? Would transferring munitions for Ukrainian fighter aircraft impact the U.S. military’s ability to conduct air superiority operations elsewhere in the world?
  • Should the United States pay to transfer U.S.-manufactured fighter jets to Ukraine? Congress may consider options for how to finance such aircraft and who should fund their purchase.
  • If the United States or another NATO member chooses to transfer aircraft to Ukraine, should the aircraft be used, new, or a mix of both?
  • Should Congress support the provision of such aircraft by NATO allies, in addition to or as an alternative to U.S. provision?

Download document here.

SECNAV, CNO Pushing Plans to Decommission 11 Warships in Fiscal Year 2024

THE PENTAGON – After unveiling a budget that wants to decommission 11 warships next year, Navy officials are appealing to the public to allow the service to move ahead with their proposal. Officials last week reiterated the Navy’s divest-to-invest approach, which argues the service needs to shed older ships to invest in newer capabilities and […]

USS Vicksburg (CG-69) getting repaired at BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair, Va., on April 8, 2022. Christopher P. Cavas Photo used with permission

THE PENTAGON – After unveiling a budget that wants to decommission 11 warships next year, Navy officials are appealing to the public to allow the service to move ahead with their proposal.

Officials last week reiterated the Navy’s divest-to-invest approach, which argues the service needs to shed older ships to invest in newer capabilities and platforms.

“One of the things we have to get real about, instead of talking about estimated service life, talking about actual service life,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said last week at the annual McAleese Conference.

“Ships need to be workable and they need to be usable. So those ships that aren’t either – usable or workable – I might be able to replace those with something that’s a little bit more agile. We may have to use them a little bit differently – get back to driving adaptability, effecting change,” he added.

It’s an argument the Navy has made before and lawmakers have rejected. In unveiling its Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal, the Navy announced plans to retire eight ships before they reach their expected service lives: two Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships, three Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships and three Ticonderoga-class cruisers. Of those eight vessels, the service tried decommission four of them last year: dock landing ships USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) and USS Tortuga (LSD-46) and cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG-69). But lawmakers ultimately blocked the service from shedding those hulls in FY 2023. The Navy is trying once again to retire them.

“The entering argument for us is our top line. And so I said earlier, we’re only going to have a navy as big as we can afford. And so then what we do is we stratify all of our platforms in terms of lethality, and that’s also informed by sustainability – what’s going to cost just to keep those ships – as well as reliability,” the CNO said.
“The friction with the Congress is capacity in the repair yards and I get that. But just having visited a repair yard with a cruiser that’s undergoing modernization as well as an older amphib, they are not making money on those ships,” Gilday added. “And they are not lethal. We’re not going to get them underway for the fight. So my proposal is let’s reinvest in something that is going to be lethal, and it is going to put us in a position of advantage against the pacing threat.”

In addition to the eight ships the Navy wants to decommission early, the service also wants to retire cruisers USS Antietam (CG-54) and USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55), and Los Angeles-class submarine USS San Juan (SSN-751). Those ships have remained in the fleet past their expected service lives.

Cruisers

USS Anzio (CG-68) pier-side at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., on April 7, 2022. USNI News Photo

For the last several budget cycles, the Navy has tried to decommission its aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers after pursuing a modernization program meant to extend the ships’ service lives past their planned 35 years.

“The cruiser mod program – we had kind of one vision how that’d play out. There were a number of factors that kind of led into how the strategy was developed. But I can tell you – the ones that are in the yard right now – the cruisers are just, I’ll say a little bit long in the tooth,” Naval Sea Systems Command chief Vice Adm. Bill Galinis said last week.

“We know how to modernize combat systems. We know how to modernize C4I systems, even the [hull, mechanical and engineering] systems. But [what] we’re seeing on the cruisers right now is really just the infrastructure of the ship. Its’ the hull. It’s the deckhouse. It’s the structural members of the ship. That’s really where the challenge is.”

As lawmakers considered the service’s proposal to decommission Vicksburg last May, the ship was 85 percent of the way through the modernization overhaul meant to extend its service life at BAE Systems Ship Repair in Norfolk, Va. Jay Stefany, the principal civilian deputy to the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, at the time confirmed to lawmakers that the service spent nearly $300 million to upgrade Vicksburg. Congress rejected the service’s proposal, barring it from decommissioning the cruiser in FY 2023.

In addition to Vicksburg, the FY 2024 request wants to decommission USS Shiloh (CG-67), as outlined in the FY 2023 30-year shipbuilding plan, and moves up the decommissioning for USS Cowpens (CG-63) from FY 2026. The accelerated timeline for Cowpens would save $130.1 million across the five-year Future Years Defense Program, according to the Navy.

Without naming specific ships, Gilday said cruisers are having to pull into ports while on deployment for structural repairs.

“For cruisers as an example, I’m pulling them into Souda Bay, Crete or I’m pulling them into Djibouti during deployment to fix holes in the ship below the water line. I got water going into berthing compartments. So those are considerations as well,” the CNO said.

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro, speaking at the same conference last week, said he’d like to divest of the aging cruisers so he can put more money into the Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers.

Over the years, Navy officials have argued to Congress that the dollars they’re putting toward the Ticonderoga-class cruisers would be better spent on modernization efforts.

“That’s our challenge right now with the cruisers is just, we’re not going to get the return on investment if we were to do all the work that we need to do on those ships and make them combat relevant to the force going forward,” Galinis said at the McAleese conference.

Landing Ship Docks

USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) enters port in Tallinn, Estonia for a scheduled port visit on Aug. 5, 2022. Estonian Navy Photo

In addition to the cruisers, the Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships – planned to have 40-year service lives – have also been at the top of the Navy’s decommissioning list the last few years.

Asked last week how much it would cost to keep Germantown, Gunston Hall, and Tortuga in the fleet, Gilday said he didn’t know the exact number but that it’s a “substantial” amount of money.

“If I take a look at what eats up our accounts – I take a look in a repair yard – I take a look at new work and growth work. On average, our new work is about 5 percent and our growth work is at about 16 percent across ships in the Navy and shipyards,” Gilday said.

“With that particular old amphibious ship, new work’s at 68 percent. So she is 4 years behind out of the shipyard. She’s costing us millions more than we need. We have to make tough decisions here. That’s money that we could pivot somewhere else,” the CNO added. He did not disclose the name of the amphibious ship.

Like Vicksburg, the Navy as of last May had spent nearly $300 million to upgrade Tortuga, which at the time was in a yard for repairs.

Gilday said he’ll have more maintenance availabilities to fund next year, and with ships waiting to go into the yards, he could use that money for other overhauls. Del Toro also pointed to the ships waiting for repairs and argued the older ships have more issues once they get to the yards.

“You want to reduce maintenance delays in the Navy to get the most bang out of the buck for the American taxpayer, well get rid of those old ships that have been sitting in shipyards for upwards of three and four years. They’re old, folks. As you open them up, you discover even more problem sets with them. They’re very close to their extended service life. You may ask why are they under their extended service life? Well, we’ve operated the living hell out of these ships, Del Toro said.

The Navy secretary said he recently saw Germantown, which has a crane aboard that has not been operable for six years. Despite efforts to repair it for several months, Del Toro said the crane is still not functioning.

“The wood deck on Germantown is starting to break through. Okay, she’s the last LSD with a wood deck in the Navy. You know how much it costs to replace that wood deck? I don’t know either, but I know it’s a lot of money. Okay, and what I will tell you is, what am I going to get out of that? Am I going to get one more year of operation at the cost of $250, $300, $400, $500 million?”

While Del Toro argued he would rather put that money toward new LPDs or the Marine Corps’ pursuit of Landing Ship Medium, the Navy has effectively ended the LPD line by pausing procurement for an indefinite amount of time.

Littoral Combat Ships

The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Montgomery (LCS 8) returns to homeport at Naval Base San Diego following the successful completion of a 12-month rotational deployment on June 10, 2020. US Navy photo.

While the Navy is trying to retire the fleet’s aging vessels, the service has also repeatedly asked to decommission some of the newest ships in service.

Over the last few years, the Navy has tried to decommission both the Freedom-class and Independence-class LCSs, but focused more intently on the Lockheed Martin and Fincantieri Marinette Marine-built Freedom ships because of a class-wide problem with the combining gear that marries the ship’s diesel engines with its gas turbines.

In accordance with last year’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, the FY 2024 recent budget proposal wants to decommission Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships USS Jackson (LCS-6) and USS Montgomery (LCS-8), commissioned in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Austal USA built both ships – slated to each have a 25-year service life – at its yard in Mobile, Ala.

Gilday last year argued that the Freedom-class ships could not stand up well in a potential conflict against China or Russia. Galinis last week made the same point about the Independence-class ships.

“You start looking at some of the earlier Littoral Combat Ships. Again, some of the things that we learned on the early ships of the two classes – both the Freedom and the Independence class – and then you look at the armament and the weapons, the combat capability on those ships, they just don’t support the high-end fight that we’re getting ready for right now. And so again, look at it really from a combat capability perspective and that’s what we’re kind of looking with why those ships should probably come out of service,” Galinis said.

Congress

Dry dock flooding begins for the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG-69) departure from BAE Systems Ship Repair dry dock pier on June 10, 2021. US Navy Photo

While the Navy’s proposal lays out its decommissioning plans for the year, Congress will ultimately get the final say.

Lawmakers have criticized both the Navy’s dives to invest budgeting approach and its decommissioning strategies, but have also allowed the service to retire older ships.

“Some of these ships – especially the Littoral Combat Ships – are among the newest in the fleet. The Navy claims they don’t have enough sufficient funding to maintain and operate these ships, but that’s not the case. Instead, they’ve mismanaged billions of dollars in maintenance funding. One glaring example of this is the USS Vicksburg, a cruiser up for decommissioning this year,” Rep. Kay Granger (R-Texas), who now chairs the House Appropriations Committee, said at a hearing last year.
“At a time when the ship is still in its maintenance period, the Navy is proposing to scrap it. If the Navy experts expect Congress to support its vision for this fleet, it must do a much better job of managing the inventory it has. We will not stand idly by as valuable taxpayer funds are wasted.”

Of the five cruisers the Navy wanted to divest of in FY 2023, lawmakers only stopped the service from retiring Vicksburg, which had not reached its 35-year service life and was nearly finished with its modernization overhaul. The other four cruisers had either reached or surpassed their expected 35-year service lives.

Last year Congress also saved the three LSDs up for decommissioning again this year – Germantown, Gunston Hall, and Tortuga – which are now 38, 35, and 34 years old, respectively. Lawmakers also saved five Littoral Combat Ships but did not specify which ones in the FY 2023 policy bill.

Japan Faces Readiness Hurdle As it Modernizes Military, Former Defense Chief Says

Japan’s toughest hurdle, as it launches an unprecedented military modernization program and doubles defense spending, is the operational readiness of its air, naval and land forces, a former chief of the Japan Self-Defense Forces said Thursday. Japan is “running out of maintenance capabilities” and stockpiles of fuel and ammunition for a protracted conflict, retired Adm. […]

A Japan Ground Self-Defense Force CH-47 Chinook, lands on the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) during a bilateral simulated casualty pick up in the Philippine Sea, March 10, 2023. U.S. Marine Corps Photo

Japan’s toughest hurdle, as it launches an unprecedented military modernization program and doubles defense spending, is the operational readiness of its air, naval and land forces, a former chief of the Japan Self-Defense Forces said Thursday.

Japan is “running out of maintenance capabilities” and stockpiles of fuel and ammunition for a protracted conflict, retired Adm. Katsutoshi Kawano said in response to questions from USNI News during an online forum hosted by a Korean-American security policy group.

Kawano pointed to the demands placed on repair and stockpiles to defend Ukraine following Russia’s invasion a little more than a year ago.

By spending defense funds on tanks, submarines and aircraft, Tokyo “did not have enough to invest” in ammunition and fuel, Kawano said. He welcomed the increase in security spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product, a NATO-set standard, because it allows more funds to go to its coast guard, intelligence integration with allies and rebuilding war stocks.

“Long-range missiles alone will not be sufficient,” Kawano said.

Japan needs precise information on targeting and damage assessment from integrated sources. Later, he added that the reorganization of the JSDF’s command structure and headquarters will make coordination with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command more efficient in emergencies. Japan’s new joint command is expected to be operational in 2024.

The reorganization also allows closer cooperation between Japan’s naval and coast guard when dealing with China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia operating in disputed waters, Yasuyo Sakata, a professor at Kanda University of International Studies, said at a Stimson Center forum earlier Thursday.

Japan is considering buying Tomahawk cruise missiles to field the counter-strike capability more quickly than producing its own intermediate range missiles. Since the Japanese have never had these weapons before, “the [J]SDF will need many kinds of exercises and experiences” to become proficient in their operation, Hosei University’s Madaka Fukuda said at the Stimson forum.

Kawano identified the period between 2024 and 2027 as the most “dangerous window of crisis” over Taiwan’s future as a self-governing democracy. Pointing to Beijing’s crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong and its increased pressure on the Senkaku Islands that are close to Taiwan, he said these missiles can provide another layer of defense. “For the first time” they allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces “to attack enemy territory.”

Kawano said President Joe Biden’s clear statements on how the United States would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan clears up any “misunderstanding” of what Washington would do in that scenario. He added that Japan would be a logistical base for U.S. operations and could get drawn more deeply into the conflict if circumstances change. The shallow waters around Taiwan do not require Japan’s advanced anti-submarine warfare skills, but Japan “can contribute to the defense of Guam with ASW capabilities,” Kawano said.

“Close cooperation with the United States is essential,” he said multiple times during the 90-minute forum. In light of Russia’s threat to use nuclear missiles in Ukraine, “Japan has to re-think its nuclear policy to deter,” Kawano said. This could include stationing U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. He added that any change in stationing remains “a high barrier” politically. Kawano said Tokyo would retain veto power over Japanese-based nuclear weapon use.

While Japan’s announcement that it will field the counter-strike missile capability has garnered a lot of attention, Kawano, who served as the head of the JSDF, said the military is facing “a very serious problem of recruiting” that could have an impact on Tokyo’s ability to react to a crisis. He identified the recruiting problem as twofold: the pool of potential enlistees and officers is shrinking and fewer are interested in serving.

About 250,000 Japanese are serving in the all-volunteer JSDF now. The pool of 18- to 26-year-olds, the prime recruiting pool, has dropped from more than 17 million in 1994 to 10.5 million now. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is about 2,000 short of its authorized end-strength of 45,307.

“Japan is an island,” and as “a maritime country, it should invest in naval and air capability,” Kawano said. He said Japan’s security concentration is on the East China Sea, which would includes the Korean Peninsula and mainland China.

“The current security environment is becoming ever more challenging” since Tokyo is now facing potentially three nuclear-armed adversaries: China, North Korea and Russia, he said. North Korea performed another intercontinental missile test shortly before Kawano spoke and South Korea’s president met with Japan’s prime minister for a summit. The missile firing occurred as the U.S. and South Korea were concluding the largest military exercise in five years that the two nations plan to expand.

At the Stimson Center event, Sakata said Japan now “sees a very tough neighborhood in Northeast Asia.”

One of the goals in the meeting between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was to re-establish closer security ties between Seoul and Tokyo. The two U.S. allies broke off sharing intelligence data during a trade dispute in the late 1990s that had its roots in the Japanese colonial occupation of the peninsula in the first half of the 20th century.

Japan’s new security strategy “acknowledged South Korea as an Indo-Pacific security partner,” Sakata said.

Earlier this year, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday, speaking to the same security group as Kawano, said it’s “no longer a luxury, but a necessity” that the three nations work together to meet the security challenges posed by North Korea, China and Russia.

Ukraine Grain Deal Renewal Still Unresolved a Day Before Expiration

By Megan Durisin, Áine Quinn and Selcan Hacaoglu (Bloomberg) — The extension of the deal that’s bolstered Ukraine’s crop exports is still clouded by uncertainty, as negotiations continue the day before…

By Megan Durisin, Áine Quinn and Selcan Hacaoglu (Bloomberg) — The extension of the deal that’s bolstered Ukraine’s crop exports is still clouded by uncertainty, as negotiations continue the day before...

In Show of Unity, NATO and EU Heads Mark Historic Visit to North Sea Platform

By Nora Buli TROLL A PLATFORM, North Sea, March 17 (Reuters) – The heads of NATO and the European Commission flew on Friday to a North Sea platform to discuss the security…

By Nora Buli TROLL A PLATFORM, North Sea, March 17 (Reuters) – The heads of NATO and the European Commission flew on Friday to a North Sea platform to discuss the security...

Pentagon: Russia Unlikely to Recover Anything Helpful From Downed Drone

It’s unlikely Russia will recover anything useful from a downed U.S. drone, the Pentagon press secretary said Thursday. Russia is likely looking to recover a U.S. MQ-9 drone that fell into the Black Sea after a Russian aircraft hit it, damaging its propeller. The U.S. decided to shoot the drone down after it was deemed […]

It’s unlikely Russia will recover anything useful from a downed U.S. drone, the Pentagon press secretary said Thursday.

Russia is likely looking to recover a U.S. MQ-9 drone that fell into the Black Sea after a Russian aircraft hit it, damaging its propeller. The U.S. decided to shoot the drone down after it was deemed uncontrollable due to the damage, USNI News previously reported.

In taking down the drone, the U.S. took steps to protect it, said Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, although he declined to go into any additional details. The drone also fell into deep water, making recovery efforts more difficult.

“Well the key point here is this is U.S. property, and it’s an intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance asset,” Ryder told reporters. “And so again, we have capabilities and means at our disposal to protect and safeguard information, which we have taken, but I just have to leave it there.”

Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev told a Russian TV station that Russia would try to recover the drone, although it was not clear if the country will be successful, according to Russian state media site TASS.

Ryder acknowledged reports that claim Russia has already recovered some parts of the drone, but he could not corroborate them.

There was more Russian activity in the Black Sea Wednesday, according to ship spotters.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet has stayed close to shore at the ports in Sevastopol and Novorossiysk due to attacks by Ukrainian forces, including using a UAV to attack the port in Sevastopol, USNI News previously reported.

Recovery efforts are complicated due to how deep the drone fell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said during a press conference Wednesday following a meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group.

“It’s probably about maybe 4,000 or 5,000 feet of water, something like that. So, any recovery operation is very difficult at that depth by anyone,” Milley said.

The U.S. also does not have any warships in the Black Sea, which is closed to warships from nations other than those on the Black Sea. The U.S. could ask for assistance from an allied nation, such as Romania, but Ryder did not have any comments on whether an ally or partner planned to help.

Another complication is that the drone likely broke up when it hit the water, Milley said.

“There’s probably not a lot to recover, frankly,” he said. “As far as the loss of anything of sensitive intelligence, et cetera, as normal, we would take – and we did take mitigating measures, so we are quite confident that whatever – whatever was of value is no longer of value.”

U.S. European Command released declassified video of the Russian Su-27 hitting the MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicle Thursday. The video also shows the Russian aircraft releasing fuel in front of the MQ-9 ahead of the hit.

It’s not unusual for the Pentagon to release video of incidents such as the UAV hit, Ryder said during the press conference.

“And so particularly in this case, given the reckless and dangerous behavior and to demonstrate publicly what type of actions the Russians had taken, we felt that it was important to provide this imagery,” Ryder said. “Certainly there are certain considerations that we have to take into account when dealing with imagery to include the classification to ensure that we’re not inadvertently putting out sensitive information. But in this case, we’re able to work through that and provide that.”

Army and Navy Cancelled March Hypersonic Test Due to Battery Failure

The Army and Navy scrubbed their latest hypersonic test flight due to a battery failure during a pre-launch check, the Navy’s top officer for strategic programs said Friday. Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe told the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee the test from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station will get re-scheduled after the problem […]

A common hypersonic glide body (C-HGB) launches from Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, at approximately 10:30 p.m. local time, March 19, 2020, during a Department of Defense flight experiment. US Navy photo.

The Army and Navy scrubbed their latest hypersonic test flight due to a battery failure during a pre-launch check, the Navy’s top officer for strategic programs said Friday.

Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe told the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee the test from the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station will get re-scheduled after the problem that caused the March 5 cancellation “is identified and corrected.”

“The services will leverage an ambitious joint flight test schedule to assess and improve the weapon system design and demonstrate performance against requirements,” Wolfe said in prepared testimony.

Wolfe and his Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Robert Rasch, said the two services are on track to deliver “intermediate range strike capability” on land and at sea, and meet important milestones this fiscal year and in the near future.

The Navy will deliver the Common Hypersonic Missile (CPS) to an Army battery at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., this year, Wolfe said.

The battery has completed new equipment training, which included a demonstration that it was C-17 deployable, Rasch said. It’s also road-mobile. The Army designates the missile as its Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).

Hypersonic weapons, moving at least five times the speed of sound, can be delivered from high altitudes in a number of ways – from aircraft, from sea and from a ballistic missile. While not a “be-all and end-all, they are a highly valuable tool,” Michael White, principal director of the hypersonic office in the office of defense research and engineering, said at the hearing.

While the United States was a pioneer in the field, “China is now leading Russia” in this field and has built “a robust infrastructure for research and development,” said Paul Freisthler, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s chief scientist for science and technology. Beijing surprised the world in 2021 with a “round-the-world” test of its hypersonic capability development. China has “three hypersonic wind tunnels capable of operating at speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, Mach 12,” he said.

He added that Russian President Vladimir Putin has boasted that Moscow developed a hypersonic weapon capable of speeds 20 times the speed of sound.

Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) said at the start of the hearing that while the United States paused developing hypersonics at the end of the the 1980s, “Russia and China made the opposite decision. Instead of mimicking our restraint as we hoped, they developed and deployed increasingly sophisticated and numerous hypersonic capabilities of various types – including nuclear-capable and orbital hypersonic weapons.”

The Navy is planning a hypersonic test shot from USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) in 2025 and from a Virginia-class Block V submarine starting in the early 2030s, Wolfe said. He said the naval platforms add stealth and increased survivability.

When asked if the continued investments in hypersonic weapons should continue, Wolfe said, “it’s the Navy view [that] this fills a need.”

Michael Horowitz, director of the Pentagon’s emerging capabilities policy office, added that hypersonics “expand the options” for conventional weapons that leaders have to deter conflict or “keep it from escalating.” He emphasized that the United States is not looking to arm hypersonic platforms with nuclear weapons.

Wolfe and Rausch cited the savings the partnered program has made in developing a common hypersonic glide body, booster stack and joint testing and experimentation.

“No single entity [in private industry] can build a hypersonic capability alone,” Rasch said.

Wolfe and Rasch noted that much of the early work in hypersonics took place in government laboratories.

Earlier this month, President Joe Biden issued a presidential directive that authorized the Defense Production Act to ramp up the hypersonics industrial base. A major goal of invoking the act is for the Pentagon to accelerate hypersonics programs that have shown promise in science and technology or research and development investments into production contracts.

Rausch and Wolfe said their services’ early partnering allowed industry to build up the necessary work force and the government to achieve economy of scale in the buy.

The Pentagon’s goal for the future with hypersonics is “to leverage common production practices,” identify the next generation technologies and “improve the throughput in test and experimentation” to more quickly field the systems and platforms, White said.

While subcommittee ranking member Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) and others pressed the panel’s witnesses for definitions of the Pentagon’s operating concept for hypersonic offensive weapons and active and passive defenses, most deferred the explanations to the follow-up classified session.

In prepared testimony, Horowitz said they are part of a mix of platforms and systems to deter an aggressor now or defeat one in conflict.

“The department is also making substantial investments in a broader array of capabilities, including long-range strike, undersea, and autonomous systems, in addition to hypersonics, that will ensure we can effectively deter through denial. For some mission sets, hypersonics can play a critical role in U.S. capabilities,” Horowitz said in his written testimony.

U.S. MQ-9 Drone Crashes in Black Sea After Encounter with Russian Fighters

A Russian Su-27 aircraft struck a U.S. unmanned MQ-9 Reaper aircraft flying over the Black Sea Tuesday causing the drone to ditch in international waters, U.S. European Command announced. The Russian Su-27 was one of two Russian fighters that intercepted the MQ-9 in what EUCOM is calling an “unsafe and unprofessional” fashion, according to the […]

MQ-9 Reaper UAV. US Air Force Photo

A Russian Su-27 aircraft struck a U.S. unmanned MQ-9 Reaper aircraft flying over the Black Sea Tuesday causing the drone to ditch in international waters, U.S. European Command announced.

The Russian Su-27 was one of two Russian fighters that intercepted the MQ-9 in what EUCOM is calling an “unsafe and unprofessional” fashion, according to the release.

At 7:30 a.m. CET, one of the Russian planes hit the MQ-9’s propeller, according to EUCOM. U.S. forces then opted to bring the unmanned aerial vehicle down in international waters, although the release does not specify if those waters were the Black Sea.

Russian Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker Righter

The release does not say if the U.S. will try to recover the MQ-9. If it crashed in the Black Sea, it could be difficult, as the U.S. is not allowed to send warships into the Black Sea, as Turkey closed the Bosphorus Strait as a result of the current Russo-Ukrainian War.

In addition to striking the MQ-9, the Russian aircraft dumped fuel on the UAV and flew in “a reckless, environmentally unsound and unprofessional manner” in front of the MQ-9, according to the release.

“Our MQ-9 aircraft was conducting routine operations in international
airspace when it was intercepted and hit by a Russian aircraft, resulting in
a crash and complete loss of the MQ-9,” U.S. Air Force Gen. James B.
Hecker, commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa, said in the release. “In fact,
this unsafe and unprofessional act by the Russians nearly caused both
aircraft to crash.”

The recent Russian actions are part of a larger pattern of Russian pilots that have interacted dangerously with U.S. and allied aircraft, according to the EUCOM release.

“These aggressive actions by Russian aircrew are dangerous and could lead to miscalculation and unintended escalation,” reads the release.

Since late 2021, the U.S. has positioned an aircraft carrier in the nearby Mediterranean and stepped up flights along NATO’s eastern flank along with U.S. Air Force and allied aircraft.

Pentagon’s Joint Concept for Competing

The following is the Feb. 10, 2023, Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Concept for Competing. From the report EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Based on combatant commander (CCDR) assessments of their limited ability to compete successfully in strategic competition, at a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Tank on 19 June 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs […]

The following is the Feb. 10, 2023, Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Joint Concept for Competing.

From the report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Based on combatant commander (CCDR) assessments of their limited ability to compete successfully in strategic competition, at a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Tank on 19 June 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed the development of a joint concept for competition to drive joint strategic planning and joint force development and design. The Joint Concept for Competing (JCC) advances an intellectual paradigm shift to enable the Joint Force, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners, to engage successfully in strategic competition. For the purposes of this concept, strategic competition is a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other. The normal and peaceful competition among allies, strategic partners, and other international actors who are not potentially hostile is outside the scope of this concept.

The Strategic Environment
Recognizing the overwhelming conventional military capability demonstrated during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003, U.S. adversaries responded by seeking to circumvent U.S. deterrent posture through competitive activity below the threshold of armed conflict with the United States. Adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power to expand the competitive space. Adversaries aim to achieve their strategic objectives through a myriad of ways and means, including statecraft and economic power as well as subversion, coercion, disinformation, and deception. They are investing in key technologies designed to offset U.S. strategic and conventional military capabilities (e.g., nuclear weapons, anti-access and area denial systems, offensive cyberspace, artificial intelligence, hypersonic delivery systems, electromagnetic spectrum). Simply put, our adversaries intend to “win without fighting,” but they are also building military forces that strengthen their ability to “fight and win” an armed conflict against the United States. Facing this dilemma, more of the same is not enough. By ignoring the threat of strategic competition, and failing to compete deliberately and proactively, the United States risks ceding strategic
influence, advantage, and leverage while preparing for a war that may never occur. The United States must remain fully prepared and poised for war, but this alone is insufficient to secure U.S. strategic interests. If the Joint Force does not change its approach to strategic competition, there is a significant risk that the United States will “lose without fighting.”

Purpose of Strategic Competition
Analyzing any adversary’s way of war is instructive. As former CJCS General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, “We think of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.” They believe they are in a long-term “conflict without combat” to alter the current international system, advance their national interests, gain strategic advantage and influence, and limit U.S. and allied options. The JCC postulates that the Joint Force should also view the spectrum of conflict as an enduring struggle between international actors with incompatible strategic interests and objectives, but who also cooperate when their interests coincide.

Strategic competition is thus an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.

The Military Challenge
How should the Joint Force, in conjunction with interorganizational partners, compete in support of U.S. Government (USG) efforts to protect and advance U.S. national interests, while simultaneously deterring aggression, countering adversary competitive strategies, and
preparing for armed conflict should deterrence and competition fail to protect vital U.S. national interests?

The Central Idea
This central idea of the JCC requires that the Joint Force expand its competitive mindset and its competitive approaches. A Joint Force with a competitive mindset will view strategic competition as a complex set of interactions in which the Joint Force contributes to broader USG efforts to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over other actors and ultimately to achieve favorable strategic outcomes. In conjunction with its interorganizational partners, the Joint Force can create competitive opportunities by using military capabilities to proactively probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities; establish behavioral patterns joint forces can exploit in a crisis to conceal U.S. intentions until it is too late to respond to them effectively; shift the competition to sub-areas in which the United States can exploit its advantages, leverage, and initiative; and attempt to divert adversaries’ attention and resources to sub-areas of secondary or tertiary importance to the United States.

Download the document here.